Journal of Behavioral Decision Making最新文献

Established procedures of analyzing the effect of context on choice consider simple, compact environments in laboratory settings. However, these approaches severely limit the study of context effects and, as a consequence, the applicability of their findings. In this paper, we generalize existing approaches in modeling choice with the aim of developing a toolbox for the analysis of observational data. We consider three main context measures: attraction, compromise, and similarity. The proposed methodology hinges on ex ante calculation of context features for every alternative in multioption, multiattribute choice sets. This approach minimizes the computational complications of estimating the resulting choice model. The proposed approach is applied to air traveler choice data using an extensive observational dataset. This yields the first examination of all three context effects simultaneously in a large observational dataset. We discuss the consequences of product (re)design based on the results of the empirical exercise to showcase the potential use of the developed methodology in managerial practice.

Philips, R., Pachur, T., Vögele, C., & Brevers, D. (2025). Does Time Pressure Alter the Affect Gap in Risky Choice? Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 38(3), e70028. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70028.

The figure descriptions for Figures 2 and 3 were inadvertently swapped in the published article. The correct descriptions for each figures are provided below:

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People often make decisions by either choosing an alternative they like (choose mode) or rejecting alternatives they dislike (reject mode). Previous research has demonstrated that these two decision modes involve distinct cognitive processes. In the current work, we further investigate whether these distinct cognitive processes in these two decision modes symmetrically or asymmetrically impact people's subsequent preferences for their preferred (chosen or nonrejected) alternatives. Across three experiments involving consumer goods, we found that participants exhibited stronger preferences for items preferred through the choose mode compared with items preferred through the reject mode. Using eye tracking, we demonstrate that this effect can be explained by more selective visual attention directed toward task-compatible alternatives in choosing versus rejecting decisions. We discuss the implications of our findings for theory and practice in the context of consumer preferences, as well as their extensions to other decision domains.

It is reasonable to expect that when making a judgment, we only consider the relevant (or diagnostic) information and that nonrelevant (nondiagnostic) information should not, and thus does not, influence our judgments. Previous research has shown that this is not always the case and that the inclusion of nondiagnostic information can reduce the impact of diagnostic information in judgments. This phenomenon is known as the dilution effect, and it has been observed for a range of judgments, including product evaluations, probability judgments, and predictions relating to people's behavior. The dilution effect has been explained as a consequence of the representativeness heuristic, such that the inclusion of nondiagnostic information reduces the match between the target and a typical member of the category. Consistent with this notion and recent approaches to moral decision making, we predict that the dilution effect should be observed for judgments about morality. Across four studies (total N = 2535), we tested for the dilution effect on judgments of morally bad actors and morally good actors. Overall, our results showed a dilution effect for judgments of both good and bad actors. People's moral evaluations of both good and bad actors were less extreme when the descriptions included nondiagnostic information. We showed that this effect is not the result of humanization, and we found that the robustness of the effect appears to be moderated by valence, with a more robust effect for bad actors. Our results highlight avenues for future research.

Qiu, T, Li, X, Lu, J. The Mere Audience-Size Effect: How Incidental Audience Non-Normatively Influences the Perceived Product Quality. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 2025; 38: e70022.

FIGURE 4 Perceived product quality as a function of audience size and deliberation order in Study 5. Error bars indicate standard errors.

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Research on intuition often produces conflicting results and suffers from reliability issues due to the lack of tools that can conclusively evaluate a person's latent intuitive position. It has been recently proposed that a decision maker's intuitive position can be evaluated by estimating parameters with sequential sampling models (SSMs), which provide a biologically plausible framework to measure how intuition affects decisions. In two studies, we use the drift diffusion model (DDM), as a type of SSM, to investigate topics where intuition is difficult to evaluate. In Study 1, we used the DDM to examine how the cognitive reflection test (CRT) scores relate to intuition in risky decision making and found that individuals with high CRT scores had superior performance and relied more on intuition. These findings challenge the conventional view that high CRT scores imply less reliance on intuition and that intuition is detrimental to decision performance. In Study 2, we examined the cross-domain stability of the preference for intuition and found that decision makers rely more on intuition in the social decision domain than in the risky decision domain and that these measures are not correlated across the two domains. The evidence for this unstable preference has hitherto primarily resulted from self-reports, which have a questionable ability to assess the preference for intuition. In both studies, we demonstrate that the DDM can accurately simulate the decision outcome and decision time patterns that are affected by intuition, providing evidence for the usefulness of DDM analysis in the study of intuition.

People often exhibit systematic differences in their risky choices when decisions elicit high anticipatory affect compared to choices that are relatively affect-poor—typically showing lower decision quality and greater risk aversion. This affect gap can be modeled by assuming that people use a compensatory strategy (i.e., a strategy that weighs outcomes against their probability of occurring) in affect-poor choices, but a simple non-compensatory strategy that considers outcome but ignores probability information in affect-rich choices. The reasons for this difference in strategy selection, however, are not yet understood. To examine whether the affect gap may reflect that in affect-rich choices, cognitive resources are more strongly taxed (leading to a simplification of the underlying decision strategy), we investigated whether the affect gap is impacted by a time pressure manipulation. Participants were asked to choose between affect-rich prospects (medical lotteries) and economically equivalent but relatively affect-poor prospects (monetary lotteries), either without a time constraint or under time pressure. The results indicated that the affect gap manifested similarly under time pressure as without time pressure. Specifically, differences between affect-rich and affect-poor choices in strategy selection did not differ between time pressure conditions, and differences in decision quality and risk aversion were even slightly attenuated under time pressure. The findings suggest that the differences in decision behavior between affect-rich and affect-poor choices are not driven by cognitive constraints. We discuss the potential psychological mechanisms involved in the affect gap.

Previous research in the judge–advisor paradigm has focused on how judges utilize the wisdom of others by taking their advice and on the beneficial effect of receiving advice on judges' postadvice final judgments about the exact same problem. However, a completely different possibility of how judges might benefit from advice has been overlooked so far: Learning processes could improve the accuracy of judges' subsequent initial judgments from one problem to another problem on the same type of task as well. Hence, we test the assumption that advice can induce individual performance enhancements that differ as a function of the advisor's judgment accuracy. The results of three experiments support our hypothesis and indicate positive learning, particularly when participants receive high-quality advice. Furthermore, we show that external information about the advisor's accuracy is not crucial for the occurrence of these individual performance enhancements. In general, our results suggest that advice can have a positive effect on judges' subsequent initial judgments.