The Evolution of Volatile Memory Forensics

Hannah Nyholm, Kristine Monteith, Seth Lyles, Micaela Gallegos, Mark Desantis, John Donaldson, C. Taylor
{"title":"The Evolution of Volatile Memory Forensics","authors":"Hannah Nyholm, Kristine Monteith, Seth Lyles, Micaela Gallegos, Mark Desantis, John Donaldson, C. Taylor","doi":"10.3390/jcp2030028","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The collection and analysis of volatile memory is a vibrant area of research in the cybersecurity community. The ever-evolving and growing threat landscape is trending towards fileless malware, which avoids traditional detection but can be found by examining a system’s random access memory (RAM). Additionally, volatile memory analysis offers great insight into other malicious vectors. It contains fragments of encrypted files’ contents, as well as lists of running processes, imported modules, and network connections, all of which are difficult or impossible to extract from the file system. For these compelling reasons, recent research efforts have focused on the collection of memory snapshots and methods to analyze them for the presence of malware. However, to the best of our knowledge, no current reviews or surveys exist that systematize the research on both memory acquisition and analysis. We fill that gap with this novel survey by exploring the state-of-the-art tools and techniques for volatile memory acquisition and analysis for malware identification. For memory acquisition methods, we explore the trade-offs many techniques make between snapshot quality, performance overhead, and security. For memory analysis, we examined the traditional forensic methods used, including signature-based methods, dynamic methods performed in a sandbox environment, as well as machine learning-based approaches. We summarize the currently available tools, and suggest areas for more research.","PeriodicalId":316237,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":3.8000,"publicationDate":"2022-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3390/jcp2030028","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2

Abstract

The collection and analysis of volatile memory is a vibrant area of research in the cybersecurity community. The ever-evolving and growing threat landscape is trending towards fileless malware, which avoids traditional detection but can be found by examining a system’s random access memory (RAM). Additionally, volatile memory analysis offers great insight into other malicious vectors. It contains fragments of encrypted files’ contents, as well as lists of running processes, imported modules, and network connections, all of which are difficult or impossible to extract from the file system. For these compelling reasons, recent research efforts have focused on the collection of memory snapshots and methods to analyze them for the presence of malware. However, to the best of our knowledge, no current reviews or surveys exist that systematize the research on both memory acquisition and analysis. We fill that gap with this novel survey by exploring the state-of-the-art tools and techniques for volatile memory acquisition and analysis for malware identification. For memory acquisition methods, we explore the trade-offs many techniques make between snapshot quality, performance overhead, and security. For memory analysis, we examined the traditional forensic methods used, including signature-based methods, dynamic methods performed in a sandbox environment, as well as machine learning-based approaches. We summarize the currently available tools, and suggest areas for more research.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
易失性内存取证的演变
易失性存储器的收集和分析是网络安全社区研究的一个充满活力的领域。不断发展和增长的威胁趋势是无文件恶意软件,它避免了传统的检测,但可以通过检查系统的随机存取内存(RAM)来发现。此外,易失性内存分析提供了对其他恶意载体的深入了解。它包含加密文件内容的片段,以及正在运行的进程、导入的模块和网络连接的列表,所有这些都很难或不可能从文件系统中提取。由于这些令人信服的原因,最近的研究工作集中在内存快照的收集和分析恶意软件存在的方法上。然而,据我们所知,目前还没有评论或调查将记忆获取和分析的研究系统化。我们通过探索最先进的易失性存储器获取和恶意软件识别分析工具和技术来填补这一空白。对于内存获取方法,我们探讨了许多技术在快照质量、性能开销和安全性之间做出的权衡。对于记忆分析,我们研究了使用的传统取证方法,包括基于签名的方法、在沙箱环境中执行的动态方法以及基于机器学习的方法。我们总结了目前可用的工具,并提出了进一步研究的领域。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
5.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Humans and Automation: Augmenting Security Operation Centers ScriptBlock Smuggling: Uncovering Stealthy Evasion Techniques in PowerShell and .NET Environments Image Encryption Algorithms: A Survey of Design and Evaluation Metrics Incidental Data: A Survey towards Awareness on Privacy-Compromising Data Incidentally Shared on Social Media Experiential Transformation in Privacy Behavior: A New Framework for Privacy Behavior Enhancement
wanfang
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1