Our paper builds a bridge between the emerging strand of research on public administration under populist rule and the established literature on delegation to independent regulatory authorities (IRAs). We focus on Italy, a critical case in Western Europe, which between 2001 and 2025 experienced six coalition governments dominated or strongly influenced by populist parties of different ideological orientations. Findings highlight that delegation to IRAs is remarkably resilient once institutionalized, even under sustained political contestation. Despite repeated populist participation in government since the early 2000s, Italian IRAs have not been subject to systematic de-delegation or statutory retrenchment. However, the preservation of formal independence has not implied the absence of means for political control. Our analysis shows that populist governments have systematically relied on political appointments. Interestingly, political appointments have not been driven by partisan loyalty or overt politicization. Instead, the intervention of populist parties has operated along a different dimension of political control that has received less attention in delegation theory: the specialization of appointees. Populist governments have displayed a preference for appointing IRAs' board members with lower levels of domain-specific specialization, privileging generalist profiles over specialists.
While prior research suggests that family ownership can significantly facilitate sales and innovation, empirical findings often overlook the nuanced differences in innovation inputs between family and non-family firms. We address this gap by examining the extent to which family firms are able to use absorptive capacity by creating knowledge internally and collaborating with external partners to enhance their innovation. Utilizing micro-level data from 9266 of the most innovative UK firms from 2006 to 2016, we employ a multi-level analysis to examine how different knowledge inputs—such as internal investments in knowledge and external collaborations at the regional and international levels—influence innovation outputs in family and non-family firms. Our findings contribute to the innovation and family business literature by providing a clearer understanding of the innovation dynamics within family firms compared to their non-family counterparts. Additionally, we offer managerial insights and outline policy implications that could foster knowledge transfer in family firms. These recommendations take into account that regional and international knowledge collaboration serves as a boundary condition for family firms to outperform their non-family counterparts.