Pub Date : 2024-04-19DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2024.2314832
Jamie Kwong
{"title":"Messaging and the bomb: public attitudes toward nuclear proliferation","authors":"Jamie Kwong","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2024.2314832","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2024.2314832","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":118564,"journal":{"name":"The Nonproliferation Review","volume":" 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140683376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-10DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2024.2306020
S. Son, Hyeongpil Ham, Man-Sung Yim
{"title":"How fear of entrapment shapes South Korean public opinion on conflicts with North Korea under US extended deterrence","authors":"S. Son, Hyeongpil Ham, Man-Sung Yim","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2024.2306020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2024.2306020","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":118564,"journal":{"name":"The Nonproliferation Review","volume":"2019 45","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140718316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-27DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2024.2314371
Malte Göttsche
Uncertainties of fissile material stockpiles are large; states observe differences between physical and book inventories. Nuclear archaeology can reduce these uncertainties. A new integrated approach would make use of data analysis techniques that take into account direct fissile material measurements, a variety of forensic measurements in shut-down facilities and of radioactive wastes, and fuel cycle operation records with related simulations. Beyond reducing uncertainties, this approach offers tools with a potential to probe declared histories and detect falsifications. This article reviews past efforts to fully capture fissile materials. Future scenarios where methods of nuclear archaeology could be used or will be required are discussed. These include improving nuclear safety and security by better knowledge on fissile materials and radioactive waste. Regarding transparency, international exercises are proposed, which could be carried out in the near term either in weapon or non-weapon states. Concerning disarmament in the longer term, fissile material baseline declarations will need to be verified to assess the potential of warhead build-up for stability during arsenal reductions, and to verify that eventually all weapons-related fissile materials are disposed of. “Historical records are used to estimate the initial load of waste in the tank because an assay of the residue can be extremely difficult. Some of the residue is sludge or solids trapped in difficult-to-reach locations of the structures; some is caught on or in the corroded carbon steel surface of the tank interior. Thorough, direct sampling and characterization are not really possible in a practical sense.”
{"title":"Nuclear archaeology to assess fissile-material inventories for nuclear safety and security, transparency, and disarmament","authors":"Malte Göttsche","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2024.2314371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2024.2314371","url":null,"abstract":"Uncertainties of fissile material stockpiles are large; states observe differences between physical and book inventories. Nuclear archaeology can reduce these uncertainties. A new integrated approach would make use of data analysis techniques that take into account direct fissile material measurements, a variety of forensic measurements in shut-down facilities and of radioactive wastes, and fuel cycle operation records with related simulations. Beyond reducing uncertainties, this approach offers tools with a potential to probe declared histories and detect falsifications. This article reviews past efforts to fully capture fissile materials. Future scenarios where methods of nuclear archaeology could be used or will be required are discussed. These include improving nuclear safety and security by better knowledge on fissile materials and radioactive waste. Regarding transparency, international exercises are proposed, which could be carried out in the near term either in weapon or non-weapon states. Concerning disarmament in the longer term, fissile material baseline declarations will need to be verified to assess the potential of warhead build-up for stability during arsenal reductions, and to verify that eventually all weapons-related fissile materials are disposed of. “Historical records are used to estimate the initial load of waste in the tank because an assay of the residue can be extremely difficult. Some of the residue is sludge or solids trapped in difficult-to-reach locations of the structures; some is caught on or in the corroded carbon steel surface of the tank interior. Thorough, direct sampling and characterization are not really possible in a practical sense.”","PeriodicalId":118564,"journal":{"name":"The Nonproliferation Review","volume":"13 22","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140374712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-02DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2023.2245653
Paul Winter
ABSTRACTIn 2010, six years after news broke that the A. Q. Khan nuclear smuggling ring was making components for Libya’s nuclear program a short distance from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia adopted comprehensive export controls. Because Malaysia, like many developing and middle-income countries, had little to gain in security terms from such controls and potentially much to lose economically, its decision to introduce them seems puzzling. Drawing on a series of interviews with Malaysian officials and civil society, this article contributes to a growing literature on states’ nonproliferation policies by exploring that puzzle. The article considers the existing literature that purports to explain why states impose export controls and identifies three plausible factors behind Malaysia’s decision to do so: international norms, side payments, and political leadership. The article then details Kuala Lumpur’s development of export controls and assesses the role of each factor. Consistent with recent studies of the international nonproliferation order, the article concludes that Malaysia’s decision to introduce export controls was driven mainly by the promise of political and economic side payments from external actors, especially the United States, and by domestic changes in political leadership.KEYWORDS: export controlsMalaysiastrategic trade controldual-use goods and technology AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank Dr. Hoo Chiew Ping of the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia for her support, the interviewees for their contributions, and Daniel Horner and the two anonymous reviewers of the Nonproliferation Review for their suggestions. The author is grateful to the Asia New Zealand Foundation for a research grant to carry out this project.Notes1 See, for example, Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World’s Most Dangerous Secrets … And How We Could Have Stopped Him (New York: Twelve, 2007).2 Douglas Stinnett, Bryan Early, Cale Horne, and Johannes Karreth, “Complying by Denying: Explaining Why States Develop Nonproliferation Export Controls,” International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2011), pp. 308–26.3 Peter Crail, “Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Risk-Based Approach,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006), pp. 355–99.4 Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Non-proliferation and Counter-Terrorism Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Meeting Global Obligations through Regional Security Architectures?” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2006), pp. 1–26.5 Richard Cupitt, Suzette Grillot, and Yuzo Murayama, “The Determinants of Nonproliferation Export Controls: A Membership-Fee Explanation,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2001), pp. 69–80.6 Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, “Trade, Knowledge Spillovers, and Growth,” European Economic Review, Vol. 35, Nos. 2–3 (1991), pp. 517–26.7 Scott Jones and Johannes Karreth, “Assessing the Economic Impact of Adopting Strateg
93 Sarah Diehl和Paula Humphrey，“2010年4月核安全峰会:向山顶又迈进了一步”，核威胁倡议，2010年4月19日，94 Joan Rohlfing，“核安全峰会”，地平线;James Keith，“更新的领导力，共同的未来”，2009年3月26日在吉隆坡马来西亚武装部队国防学院的演讲。James Keith，“马来西亚的潜力和相关性”，2009年2月27日在华盛顿卡内基国际和平基金会的演讲，引自Stephanie Lieggi和Richard Sabatini，“马来西亚的出口管制法:“向前迈进了一步，但有多大”，《核威胁倡议》，2010年5月9日，97 . Kareem，“马来西亚战略贸易管制的实施与执行”，第108.98页，Kareem访谈，99Kareem，“战略贸易管制在马来西亚的实施和执行”，第105.100页Ronald McCoy，国际预防核战争医师协会，对作者的采访，吉隆坡，2018年4月19日Keong interview.105Keong interview.106美国国务院，“[国务卿希拉里·克林顿]与马来西亚外长阿尼法·阿曼的谈话”，吉隆坡，2010年11月2日;林利，“奥巴马祝贺纳吉布在大规模杀伤性武器问题上的立场”，《星报》，2010年4月13日;婆罗洲邮报，“马来西亚和美国同意加强核武器条约”，2010年4月14日，.108 Ian Rinehart，“马来西亚:背景和美国关系”，CRS报告R43505，国会研究服务，2014年，第14 - 15页，.109马来西亚统计局，“马来西亚外国直接投资统计，2020年，”2021年6月18日，.110 Lee，“奥巴马祝贺纳吉布。”111 Todd Perry，“通过出口管制外展减少扩散风险:援助提供者使用基于成熟度模型的方法”，《战略贸易评论》，第5卷，第7期(2019)，第5 - 24页。112穆罕默德·马哈蒂尔，在国际核会议上的演讲，吉隆坡，2002年10月15日，113美国政府问责局，防扩散;美国打击核网络的努力需要更好的关于扩散风险和项目结果的数据(华盛顿特区，2007)，第13-14页，114页Mark J. Valencia，“防扩散安全倡议:马来西亚应该加入吗?”丽贝卡·戴维斯·吉本斯，“美国霸权与核不扩散制度的政治”，博士论文，第142期(2005)，第14-16.116页。118 Lawrence Scheinman主编，《执行第1540号决议:区域组织的作用》(纽约:联合国裁军研究所，2008);119 ogilvey - white，《防扩散与反恐合作》。paul Winter拥有奥塔哥大学政治学博士和国际研究硕士学位。2016年，他作为富布赖特学者在乔治城大学进行研究生研究，他是弗雷伯格奖学金的获得者。他之前的出版物集中在国际安全、核扩散和统计建模方面。他目前在新西兰政府工作。
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Pub Date : 2023-09-11DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2023.2245226
Martin Claar, Damir Kovačević
In what way has the impermissibility of chemical weapons affected the permissibility of chemical defoliants and incendiaries, namely Agent Orange and napalm? These two chemical agents were heavily used throughout the Vietnam War under three separate US administrations. Their novelty and effectiveness made them an important tool in US military operations in the region. During the Johnson and Nixon administrations, however, the weapons came under question and were ultimately re-evaluated before their use was restricted, but there is debate about what caused this shift in policy. The goal of this article is to investigate the forces that led to that restriction and to determine the role the chemical-weapons taboo may have played in this re-evaluated status. Thus, we are testing whether asocial factors such as deterrence and utility or social factors such as norms relating to chemical-weapons use and social-feedback mechanisms caused this policy shift. We conclude that social factors resulting from wartime experience—especially feedback from domestic, international, and epistemic communities—most influenced the status of Agent Orange and napalm.
{"title":"Nowhere to hide: the use of chemical agents during the Vietnam War","authors":"Martin Claar, Damir Kovačević","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2023.2245226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2023.2245226","url":null,"abstract":"In what way has the impermissibility of chemical weapons affected the permissibility of chemical defoliants and incendiaries, namely Agent Orange and napalm? These two chemical agents were heavily used throughout the Vietnam War under three separate US administrations. Their novelty and effectiveness made them an important tool in US military operations in the region. During the Johnson and Nixon administrations, however, the weapons came under question and were ultimately re-evaluated before their use was restricted, but there is debate about what caused this shift in policy. The goal of this article is to investigate the forces that led to that restriction and to determine the role the chemical-weapons taboo may have played in this re-evaluated status. Thus, we are testing whether asocial factors such as deterrence and utility or social factors such as norms relating to chemical-weapons use and social-feedback mechanisms caused this policy shift. We conclude that social factors resulting from wartime experience—especially feedback from domestic, international, and epistemic communities—most influenced the status of Agent Orange and napalm.","PeriodicalId":118564,"journal":{"name":"The Nonproliferation Review","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135980717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-30DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2023.2202966
Ana Sánchez-Cobaleda
ABSTRACTThis article analyzes how the legal sources of nonproliferation regimes define “dual-use items,” a concept that lacks a universal and fixed definition despite its importance to international security and trade. The analysis shows how these legally binding and soft-law sources approach dual-use goods and technologies differently and classifies them based on the criteria they employ to define the potential uses of these strategic items: the dichotomies of peaceful versus non-peaceful and civil versus military, and the intentionality criterion. The article also traces the expansion of the concept beyond a concern with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It analyzes how the existence of multiple criteria to define such items affects their international control. It also considers the evolution that this notion may undergo, which may call into question the standards of legal certainty that the international regime of dual-use items aims to provide.KEYWORDS: dual-use itemsnonproliferationweapons of mass destruction (WMD)export-control regimesstrategic itemstrade controls AcknowledgmentsThe author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers and the editorial team of the Nonproliferation Review for their helpful comments, as well as Milagros Álvarez-Verdugo and Alexandros Tokhi for their comments on earlier drafts. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the organizations with which she is affiliated. All mistakes remain the responsibility of the author.Notes1 Caitríona McLeish, “Reflecting on the Problem of Dual Use,” in Caitríona McLeish and Brian Rappert, eds., A Web of Prevention: Biological Weapons, Life Sciences and the Governance of Research (London: Earthscan, 2007), pp. 189–208; David Resnik, “What Is Dual Use Research? A Response to Miller and Selgelid,” Science and Engineering Ethics, Vol. 15 (2009), pp. 3–5; Brian Rappert and Michael J. Selgelid, eds., On the Dual Uses of Science and Ethics: Principles, Practices, and Prospects (Canberra: ANU Press, 2013); Quentin Michel, “Dual-Use Exports Require a Common Definition,” in Friends of Europe, ed., Dual-Use Technologies in the European Union: Prospects for the Future (Brussels: Friends of Europe, 2015), pp. 40–42.2 Samuel A.W. Evans, “Revising Export Control Lists,” Flemish Peace Institute, 2014, p. 3, .3 Ian Anthony, “The Evolution of Dual-Use Technology Controls: A Historical Perspective,” in Oliver Meier, ed., Technology Transfers and Non-Proliferation: Between Control and Cooperation (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 27.4 Harald Müller and Carmen Wunderlich, “Not Lost in Contestation: How Norm Entrepreneurs Frame Norm Development in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 39, No. 3 (2018), p. 356.5 Andreas Persbo and Angela Woodward, “Detection, Deterrence and Confidence-Building: Improving Multilateral Technolo
摘要本文分析了防扩散制度的法律渊源如何定义“两用物项”，这一概念尽管对国际安全和贸易具有重要意义，但缺乏普遍和固定的定义。分析显示了这些具有法律约束力的软法律来源如何以不同的方式对待双重用途物品和技术，并根据它们用来定义这些战略物品的潜在用途的标准对它们进行分类:和平与非和平、民用与军事的二分法，以及意向性标准。文章还追溯了这一概念的扩展，超越了对大规模毁灭性武器扩散的关注。它分析了界定这类物项的多重标准如何影响其国际管制。它还审议了这一概念可能发生的演变，这可能使人对双重用途物品国际制度旨在提供的法律确定性标准产生疑问。关键词:军民两用物项防扩散大规模杀伤性武器出口管制制度战略物项贸易管制鸣谢作者要感谢两位匿名审稿人和《防扩散评论》编辑团队提供的有益意见，以及Milagros Álvarez-Verdugo和Alexandros Tokhi对早期草稿的评论。本文中表达的观点是作者的观点，并不反映她所属组织的观点。所有的错误都由作者负责。注1 Caitríona McLeish，“对双重用途问题的反思”，见Caitríona McLeish和Brian Rappert主编。，《预防网络:生物武器、生命科学和研究治理》(伦敦:Earthscan, 2007)，页189-208;David Resnik，“什么是军民两用研究?”对Miller和Selgelid的回应，“科学与工程伦理，Vol. 15 (2009)， pp. 3-5;Brian Rappert和Michael J. Selgelid编。《科学与伦理的双重用途:原则、实践与展望》(堪培拉:澳大利亚国立大学出版社，2013);Quentin Michel，《双重用途出口需要一个共同的定义》，载于欧洲之友主编，《欧盟的双重用途技术:未来展望》(布鲁塞尔:欧洲之友，2015)，第40-42.2页。Samuel A.W. Evans，《修订出口管制清单》，佛兰德和平研究所，2014年，第3页。Ian Anthony，《双重用途技术管制的演变:一个历史视角》，载于Oliver Meier主编，《技术转让与不扩散:控制与合作之间》(纽约:Harald m<e:1> ller和Carmen Wunderlich，“不迷失在争论中:规范企业家如何在核不扩散制度中构建规范发展”，《当代安全政策》，第39卷，第3期(2018)，第356.5页。Andreas Persbo和Angela Woodward，“检测、威慑和建立信任:改善多边技术控制”，载于Meier，技术转让和不扩散，第77-95页;西比勒·鲍尔、马克·布罗姆利:《军民两用出口管制政策审查:在不断变化的世界中平衡安全、贸易和学术自由》，《欧盟防扩散与裁军联盟》，2016年3月，第48期;奈米拉·尼格姆:《国际法下的核技术转让:伊拉克、伊朗和以色列的案例研究》(莱顿:Martinus Nijhoff出版社，2009);马修·克鲁尼格，《出口炸弹:技术转让与核武器扩散》(伊萨卡，纽约州:康奈尔大学出版社，2010);Seema Gahlaut，“多边出口管制制度:运作、成功、失败和未来的挑战”，见Daniel H. Joyner主编，《防扩散出口管制:起源、挑战和加强建议》(伯灵顿，佛蒙特州:Ashgate出版社，2006)，第246页;昆汀·米歇尔、Sylvain Paile、Marina Tsukanova、Andrea Viski:《控制军民两用物品贸易》(伯尔尼:Peter Lang出版社，2013);Scott Jones, Michael D. Beck和Seema Gahlaut，“贸易管制与国际安全”，载于Nathan E. Busch和Daniel H. Joyner主编。，《打击大规模杀伤性武器:国际防扩散政策的未来》(乔治亚州雅典:佐治亚大学出版社，2009年)，第118-35.7页，美国国家科学院国家研究委员会，《恐怖主义时代的生物技术研究》[“芬克报告”](华盛顿特区:美国国家科学院出版社，2004年);Ronald M. Atlas和Malcolm R. Dando，“生命科学的双重用途困境:观点、难题和全球解决方案”，《生物安全和生物恐怖主义》，第4卷，第3期(2006)，第276-86页;赵璐，“降低生命科学“双重用途”研究风险的框架挑战”，《未来》，第102期(2018)，页。 54 .虽然不允许在核武器中使用核能，但核能在某些“不受禁止”的军事用途上——特别是使用核反应堆来推动潜艇国际原子能机构,INFCIRC / 254 /牧师。10/Part2(修正)，2018年2月，.55 IAEA, INFCIRC/254/Rev.;12/ 2部分，2022年7月29日，条款1,56慕尼黑经济峰会，“政治宣言:塑造新的伙伴关系”，28周刊比较出版社文件1213,1219(13/07/1992)，引自Barry J. Hurewitz，“不扩散和自由进入外层空间:《外层空间条约》与导弹技术管制制度之间的双重用途冲突》，《高技术法杂志》，第9卷，第2期(1994年)，第225.57页。埃文斯，“修订出口管制清单”，第32.58页，奥利弗·梅尔和艾瑞斯·饥饿，“管制与合作之间:《技术转让与不扩散大规模毁灭性武器》，德意志自由基金会，2014年，第35页，第59页，“如果一类项目被纳入一个系统，该系统也将被视为一类，除非所纳入的项目无法分离、删除或复制。”jjaved Ali，“化学武器与两伊战争:一个不遵守的案例研究”，《防扩散评论》，第8卷，第1期(2001)，p. 50.61 Meier and Hunger，“控制与合作之间”，p. 21.62 Ian J. Stewart，“无形控制的检验”，Project Alpha，伦敦国王学院，2016，;Kolja Brockmann和Robert Kelley，“新兴技术对防扩散努力的挑战:控制增材制造和无形技术转让”，SIPRI, 2018, 63 AG，“澳大利亚集团共同控制清单”，No d， .64 James I. Seevaratnam，“澳大利亚集团:起源，成就和挑战，”防扩散评论，第13卷，第2期(2006)，pp. 401-15.65 WA，指南和程序;Michael L. Lipson，“COCOM的转世:对冷战后出口管制的解释”，《防扩散评论》第6卷第2期(1999)，第33-51.66页，《军民两用物品、技术和弹药清单》，2013年12月4日，WA- List(13) 1, 2019年12月5日。68 Evans，“修订出口管制清单”，p. 19.69 Mark Bromley，“出口管制、人类安全和网络监控技术:Quentin Michel, Christos Charatsis, Lia Caponetti, Sylvain Paile, Emanuela Marrone，“学术活动是否助长了大规模杀伤性武器的扩散?”法国里昂热大学欧洲研究中心，2018;鲍尔和布罗姆利，“军民两用出口管制政策审查”;Samuel A.W. Evans和Walter D. Valdivia，“出口
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