Pub Date : 2020-05-07DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198854937.003.0008
K. Himma
Chapter 8 addresses the Content Problem of Legal Normativity, arguing that the content of the only first-order motivating reason to which the practices constituting something as a system of law are reasonably contrived to give rise is an objective motivating reason to obey law as a means of avoiding being subject to coercive sanctions. It rejects one possible solution to the Content Problem, arguing that there is nothing in objective norms of practical rationality that would encourage us, even presumptively, to obey a norm simply because it has the status of law. Since there is nothing else in these practices reasonably contrived to give rise to an objective motivating reason with different content, neither the How Problem nor the Content Problem can be solved without assuming it is a conceptual truth that some mandatory legal norms governing non-official behavior provide objective motivating reasons to comply in virtue of being backed with the threat of a coercive sanction.
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Pub Date : 2020-05-07DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198854937.003.0007
K. Himma
Chapter 7 addresses the Order Problem of Legal Normativity, arguing that there is no reason to think that the practices constituting something as a system of law must be reasonably contrived to give rise to objective exclusionary motivating reasons to comply with mandatory legal norms governing non-official behavior. It argues that there are three basic sources of objective motivating reasons and that there is nothing in these constitutive practices reasonably contrived to give rise to objective exclusionary motivating reasons from any of these sources. It then argues that these constitutive practices are equipped to do everything that a legal system can be non-idiosyncratically used to do simply in virtue of providing objective motivating prudential reasons to comply with mandatory legal norms governing non-official behavior; the claim that these constitutive practices can produce objective exclusionary motivating reasons explains nothing about legal normativity that needs to be explained.
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