{"title":"Hermann von Helmholtz and logical empiricism","authors":"M. Heidelberger","doi":"10.4324/9781315650647-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315650647-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":211331,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123146927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-23DOI: 10.4324/9781315650647-14
N. Milkov
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the philosopher Hans Reichenbach led a group of likeminded colleagues in Berlin that must count as an independent point of origin of the movement of logical empiricism. Like the Vienna Circle with whom they cooperated on numerous occasions, their concern was to develop a philosophy of science adequate to the latest advances in science itself. Differences of philosophical background and interests, however, resulted in putting different accents by justifying scientific knowledge.
{"title":"The Berlin Group and the Society for Scientific Philosophy","authors":"N. Milkov","doi":"10.4324/9781315650647-14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315650647-14","url":null,"abstract":"In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the philosopher Hans Reichenbach led a group of likeminded colleagues in Berlin that must count as an independent point of origin of the movement of logical empiricism. Like the Vienna Circle with whom they cooperated on numerous occasions, their concern was to develop a philosophy of science adequate to the latest advances in science itself. Differences of philosophical background and interests, however, resulted in putting different accents by justifying scientific knowledge.","PeriodicalId":211331,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114374722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-23DOI: 10.4324/9781315650647-31
J. O'neill
{"title":"Neurath on political economy","authors":"J. O'neill","doi":"10.4324/9781315650647-31","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315650647-31","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":211331,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122402638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-23DOI: 10.4324/9781315650647-27
F. Padovani
{"title":"Reichenbach and the problem of induction","authors":"F. Padovani","doi":"10.4324/9781315650647-27","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315650647-27","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":211331,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117089047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-23DOI: 10.4324/9781315650647-36
J. Woleński
{"title":"The Lvov-Warsaw School and logical empiricism","authors":"J. Woleński","doi":"10.4324/9781315650647-36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315650647-36","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":211331,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism","volume":"464 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116411846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-23DOI: 10.4324/9781315650647-10
Anastasios Brenner
{"title":"French conventionalism and the Vienna Circle","authors":"Anastasios Brenner","doi":"10.4324/9781315650647-10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315650647-10","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":211331,"journal":{"name":"The Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126098309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-23DOI: 10.4324/9781315650647-28
Sean Crawford
Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, and Herbert Feig are the most prominent of the positivists to formulate views on the mind-body problem. (C. G. Hempel’s one-off treatment [1935] is set aside here; see Kim [2003] and Crawford [2013].) While their views differed from each other and changed over time, they were all committed to some form of scientific physicalism, though a linguistic or conceptual rather than ontological form of it. In focus here are their views during the heyday of logical positivism and its immediate aftermath, though some initial scene-setting of Schlick’s and Carnap’s pre-positivist views will help to understand the final opposing positions of Carnap and Feigl. All three philosophers are largely—entirely, in the case of Schlick and Feigl—concerned with sensations and sensory consciousness, or what Feigl came to call (after the psychologist E. C. Tolman) “raw feels” and what are now usually called “qualia” or “phenomenally conscious” mental states.
莫里茨·施里克、鲁道夫·卡尔纳普和赫伯特·费格是实证主义者中对心身问题提出观点的最杰出的人。(C. G. Hempel的一次性治疗[1935]在此暂不提;参见Kim[2003]和Crawford[2013]。)虽然他们的观点彼此不同，并随着时间的推移而改变，但他们都致力于某种形式的科学物理主义，尽管是语言或概念形式，而不是本体论形式。这里的重点是他们在逻辑实证主义鼎盛时期及其直接后果的观点，尽管施里克和卡尔纳普的前实证主义观点的一些初步场景设置将有助于理解卡尔纳普和费格尔的最终对立立场。在施里克和菲格尔的例子中，这三位哲学家都在很大程度上——完全地——关注感觉和感官意识，或者是菲格尔后来(以心理学家e·c·托尔曼(E. C. Tolman)的名字命名的“原始感觉”，以及现在通常被称为“感质”或“现象意识”的精神状态。
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