Pub Date : 2004-01-01DOI: 10.1080/08997225.2004.10556299
I. Engleberg
Credos—formal statements of belief and principles (from Latin credo, meaning ‘‘I believe’’)—are not policies or professional codes. Rather, credos epitomize the core beliefs of an institution, organization, or society, as is the case in religious credos that set forth statements of belief and confessions of faith. Thus far, the National Communication Association has formally adopted three credos: 1. Credo for Free and Responsible Communication in a Democratic Society (Adopted December 1972) 2. Credo for Free and Responsible Use of Electronic Communication Networks (Approved 1994) 3. Credo for Ethical Communication (Adopted November 1999) All three credos can be found on the NCA Website (www.natcom.org) by searching the term credo. At the 2005 Eastern Communication Association Convention, a program entitled ‘‘Considering Meaning and Influence of NCA Credos in Teaching and Scholarship’’ reviewed and discussed the NCA credos. Several questions emerged: ● Are there criteria for defining the purpose and function of NCA credos? ● What is the practical value of these credos? ● Why does the National Communication Association have three credos? ● Does one of these credos subsume the others? ● Could these credos be combined into one comprehensive credo for the National Communication Association and the communication discipline? The belief statements in these credos express core values about the function of communication in a democracy as well as foundational beliefs about the communication discipline. These interrelated roles have been discussed in books, journals and convention programs for decades. For example, in 1990, Communication Quarterly published an essay by Ronald Arnett entitled ‘‘The Practical Philosophy of Communication and Free Speech as the Foundation for Speech Communication.’’ Arnett presented the argument ‘‘that the study of communication ethics and free speech is the practical heart of the disciplinary field known as speech communication’’ (208). After offering a definition of practical philosophy and its connection to communication studies, Arnett described the practical value of this connection:
{"title":"Where Have All the Credos Gone?","authors":"I. Engleberg","doi":"10.1080/08997225.2004.10556299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997225.2004.10556299","url":null,"abstract":"Credos—formal statements of belief and principles (from Latin credo, meaning ‘‘I believe’’)—are not policies or professional codes. Rather, credos epitomize the core beliefs of an institution, organization, or society, as is the case in religious credos that set forth statements of belief and confessions of faith. Thus far, the National Communication Association has formally adopted three credos: 1. Credo for Free and Responsible Communication in a Democratic Society (Adopted December 1972) 2. Credo for Free and Responsible Use of Electronic Communication Networks (Approved 1994) 3. Credo for Ethical Communication (Adopted November 1999) All three credos can be found on the NCA Website (www.natcom.org) by searching the term credo. At the 2005 Eastern Communication Association Convention, a program entitled ‘‘Considering Meaning and Influence of NCA Credos in Teaching and Scholarship’’ reviewed and discussed the NCA credos. Several questions emerged: ● Are there criteria for defining the purpose and function of NCA credos? ● What is the practical value of these credos? ● Why does the National Communication Association have three credos? ● Does one of these credos subsume the others? ● Could these credos be combined into one comprehensive credo for the National Communication Association and the communication discipline? The belief statements in these credos express core values about the function of communication in a democracy as well as foundational beliefs about the communication discipline. These interrelated roles have been discussed in books, journals and convention programs for decades. For example, in 1990, Communication Quarterly published an essay by Ronald Arnett entitled ‘‘The Practical Philosophy of Communication and Free Speech as the Foundation for Speech Communication.’’ Arnett presented the argument ‘‘that the study of communication ethics and free speech is the practical heart of the disciplinary field known as speech communication’’ (208). After offering a definition of practical philosophy and its connection to communication studies, Arnett described the practical value of this connection:","PeriodicalId":439135,"journal":{"name":"Free Speech Yearbook","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115736787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-01-01DOI: 10.1080/08997225.2004.10556309
C. Scott
Anonymous communication has a relatively long and sometimes controversial history in this country. From the anonymous publishing of the Federalist Papers under the pseudonym ‘‘Publius’’ over two centuries ago to anonymous sources such as ‘‘Deep Throat’’ during the Watergate scandal, anonymity has played and continues to perform a unique role in American culture. The ability to communicate anonymously is viewed as part of our basic right to free speech—an interpretation historically upheld in U.S. courts (Bowman 2001) but increasingly problematized by new communication technologies (see Lipinski 2002). Indeed, concerns and debates about anonymous communication may well be at an all time high. Even though we all experience anonymity in a variety of somewhat mundane ways (e.g., anonymous letters to the editor/media, tips to law enforcement, organizational evaluations/appraisals, ‘‘leaks’’ and ‘‘whistleblowing,’’ church confessionals, suggestion boxes, ‘‘secret’’ admirers, letters with no return address, call-in radio show comments, anonymous gift giving, caller-id blocking, some forms of electronic mail, certain online meetings, and a range of support groups; see Anonymous 1998; Marx 1999), recent events have propelled discussions of anonymity to the national stage. The anthrax-laced letters anonymously sent to various influential individuals in our country in late 2001 and the invasive legislation prompted in part by such actions, as well as the growing use (and some would argue, misuse) of new communication technologies affording users at least some anonymity,point to two influential explanations for our growing interest and concern about anonymous communication. First, in the ongoing aftermath from the events of September 11, 2001, there exists a climate of suspicion and heightened security that seems increasingly interested in establishing identity. Terrorists’ use of the Internet to communicate with one another covertly has furthered concerns by law enforcement and others (Wieland 2001). Indeed, Marx (2001) confirms that identification technologies have greatly expanded in recent years (e.g., facial/retinal/vocal recognition systems). As will be examined in more detail below, judicial and organizational officials are increasingly likely to take actions limiting one’s privacy and to provide identifying information in the name of national security—all of which erodes anonymity. However, this has led, in part, to resistance through anonymity. Samoriski (2002) suggests
{"title":"Benefits and Drawbacks of Anonymous Online Communication: Legal Challenges and Communicative Recommendations","authors":"C. Scott","doi":"10.1080/08997225.2004.10556309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997225.2004.10556309","url":null,"abstract":"Anonymous communication has a relatively long and sometimes controversial history in this country. From the anonymous publishing of the Federalist Papers under the pseudonym ‘‘Publius’’ over two centuries ago to anonymous sources such as ‘‘Deep Throat’’ during the Watergate scandal, anonymity has played and continues to perform a unique role in American culture. The ability to communicate anonymously is viewed as part of our basic right to free speech—an interpretation historically upheld in U.S. courts (Bowman 2001) but increasingly problematized by new communication technologies (see Lipinski 2002). Indeed, concerns and debates about anonymous communication may well be at an all time high. Even though we all experience anonymity in a variety of somewhat mundane ways (e.g., anonymous letters to the editor/media, tips to law enforcement, organizational evaluations/appraisals, ‘‘leaks’’ and ‘‘whistleblowing,’’ church confessionals, suggestion boxes, ‘‘secret’’ admirers, letters with no return address, call-in radio show comments, anonymous gift giving, caller-id blocking, some forms of electronic mail, certain online meetings, and a range of support groups; see Anonymous 1998; Marx 1999), recent events have propelled discussions of anonymity to the national stage. The anthrax-laced letters anonymously sent to various influential individuals in our country in late 2001 and the invasive legislation prompted in part by such actions, as well as the growing use (and some would argue, misuse) of new communication technologies affording users at least some anonymity,point to two influential explanations for our growing interest and concern about anonymous communication. First, in the ongoing aftermath from the events of September 11, 2001, there exists a climate of suspicion and heightened security that seems increasingly interested in establishing identity. Terrorists’ use of the Internet to communicate with one another covertly has furthered concerns by law enforcement and others (Wieland 2001). Indeed, Marx (2001) confirms that identification technologies have greatly expanded in recent years (e.g., facial/retinal/vocal recognition systems). As will be examined in more detail below, judicial and organizational officials are increasingly likely to take actions limiting one’s privacy and to provide identifying information in the name of national security—all of which erodes anonymity. However, this has led, in part, to resistance through anonymity. Samoriski (2002) suggests","PeriodicalId":439135,"journal":{"name":"Free Speech Yearbook","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127151494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-01-01DOI: 10.1080/08997225.2004.10556310
P. Siegel
The 2003-2004 Term was not a very busy one from the perspective of Yearbook readers. To be sure, campaign finance reform was a major feature of the year, and the federal legislation before the Court had more direct implications for the act of communication than the issue usually enjoys. No need for parroting such slogans as ‘‘money equals speech’’ this time around, in that the statute set forth explicit instructions to candidates which have resulted in advertisements carrying the oft-parodied assertion that ‘‘my name is , and I approved of this ad.’’ Then too, the Court also issued the latest in a series of rulings on sexual communication on the Internet, again finding that Congress had overstepped its bounds in its laudable zeal to protect children from indecent speech. The Term also featured a more minor decision concerning the logistics for handling licensing schemes for ‘‘adult’’ businesses. The third and last communication-relevant issue addressed by the Court in its 2003-2004 Term was access to information. In one of two such cases, at issue was the application of privacy interests under Exemption 7C of the Freedom of Information Act to surviving family members; the second dealt with far more arcane matters governing separation of powers, executive privilege, and the standards to be used in determining when to issue a writ of mandamus. The case is discussed here because at its core was whether public interest groups would ever get to learn the extent to which unidentified energy industry executives helped create the Bush Administration’s policies as formulated by a task force chaired by the Vice President back in 2001. Before beginning our extended discussions of this handful of decisions, passing mention should be made of one non-decision that received much press attention during the 2003-2004 Term. Elk Grove United School District v. Newdow (2004) appeared as if it would settle definitively whether insertion of the words ‘‘under God’’ into the Pledge of Allegiance was constitutional as applied to public school children. But alas, the Court managed to skirt the issue by finding that Mr. Newdow, as a non-custodial parent, did not have standing to bring the suit on behalf of his minor daughter.
{"title":"The Supreme Court and Freedom of Speech, 2003–2004","authors":"P. Siegel","doi":"10.1080/08997225.2004.10556310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997225.2004.10556310","url":null,"abstract":"The 2003-2004 Term was not a very busy one from the perspective of Yearbook readers. To be sure, campaign finance reform was a major feature of the year, and the federal legislation before the Court had more direct implications for the act of communication than the issue usually enjoys. No need for parroting such slogans as ‘‘money equals speech’’ this time around, in that the statute set forth explicit instructions to candidates which have resulted in advertisements carrying the oft-parodied assertion that ‘‘my name is , and I approved of this ad.’’ Then too, the Court also issued the latest in a series of rulings on sexual communication on the Internet, again finding that Congress had overstepped its bounds in its laudable zeal to protect children from indecent speech. The Term also featured a more minor decision concerning the logistics for handling licensing schemes for ‘‘adult’’ businesses. The third and last communication-relevant issue addressed by the Court in its 2003-2004 Term was access to information. In one of two such cases, at issue was the application of privacy interests under Exemption 7C of the Freedom of Information Act to surviving family members; the second dealt with far more arcane matters governing separation of powers, executive privilege, and the standards to be used in determining when to issue a writ of mandamus. The case is discussed here because at its core was whether public interest groups would ever get to learn the extent to which unidentified energy industry executives helped create the Bush Administration’s policies as formulated by a task force chaired by the Vice President back in 2001. Before beginning our extended discussions of this handful of decisions, passing mention should be made of one non-decision that received much press attention during the 2003-2004 Term. Elk Grove United School District v. Newdow (2004) appeared as if it would settle definitively whether insertion of the words ‘‘under God’’ into the Pledge of Allegiance was constitutional as applied to public school children. But alas, the Court managed to skirt the issue by finding that Mr. Newdow, as a non-custodial parent, did not have standing to bring the suit on behalf of his minor daughter.","PeriodicalId":439135,"journal":{"name":"Free Speech Yearbook","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126983995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-01-01DOI: 10.1080/08997225.2004.10556304
Peggy J. Bowers
In the months before the 2004 Democratic National Convention in Boston, city officials unveiled a plan to deal with the anticipated thousands of protesters who would descend on the city to make their views known to the candidates, delegates and citizens. The ‘‘free-speech zone’’ was a small triangle of land bounded by train tracks, service roads and a parking lot for buses and media trucks, mostly out of sight of the Fleet Center where the delegates would gather. The zone would hold only about 400 people at a time. ‘‘What’s the point to just have a rally, when you don’t have an audience for whom the rally is organized?’’ said Urszula Masney-Latos, executive director of the National Lawyers Guild’s Massachusetts chapter (Klein 2004). Carl Rose, Massachusetts ACLU executive director, put it more succinctly: ‘‘We don’t want it to be a free-speech pen.’’ Such a dilemma has become all too commonplace across the country as government officials, claiming a host of competing concerns such as public safety, relegate meaningful public speech to the hinterlands of democracy, physically and figuratively. The use of public space for free speech is hardly ever questioned in principle but finds itself increasingly threatened in practice, and for the reason Masney-Latos and Rose have noted, namely, a disconnection exists in contemporary society between the idea of free speech as a constitutional right and the practice of free speech in a meaningful way. The disjuncture is embodied in our attitudes toward physical space and its relationship to free expression. The physical expression of free speech, speakers’ ability to move fluidly among those with whom they wish to communicate, is symbolic of its robustness to significantly reach the public for whom and by whom free speech is intended. Take the protests against the World Trade Organization and the Free Trade Areas of the Americas summit, staged in Seattle and in Miami, respectively, as examples. While Seattle was subject to the passion that free speech often breeds (Thomas 2000), the city of Miami had learned Seattle’s lesson well. Protesters were restrained from staging their protests within eyesight or earshot of delegates who cut their private deliberations short by a day and took ocean excursions to keep protesters from airing their views (Pain 2003; Nielsen 2003). Indeed, consider the differences in number and practice of public protests in the Vietnam era and those of the war in Iraq. Thus, even as public officials make the exchange of ideas increasingly difficult in physical space, citizens have gradually acculturated to the notion that their voices are no longer necessary or possible. Protest has been physically removed from the sites of commerce and pleasure, and symbolically removed as well in its evisceration, slowly and deliberately by the Supreme Court aided by the
{"title":"Democratic Space: Mass Media Connections to Public Forum Law","authors":"Peggy J. Bowers","doi":"10.1080/08997225.2004.10556304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997225.2004.10556304","url":null,"abstract":"In the months before the 2004 Democratic National Convention in Boston, city officials unveiled a plan to deal with the anticipated thousands of protesters who would descend on the city to make their views known to the candidates, delegates and citizens. The ‘‘free-speech zone’’ was a small triangle of land bounded by train tracks, service roads and a parking lot for buses and media trucks, mostly out of sight of the Fleet Center where the delegates would gather. The zone would hold only about 400 people at a time. ‘‘What’s the point to just have a rally, when you don’t have an audience for whom the rally is organized?’’ said Urszula Masney-Latos, executive director of the National Lawyers Guild’s Massachusetts chapter (Klein 2004). Carl Rose, Massachusetts ACLU executive director, put it more succinctly: ‘‘We don’t want it to be a free-speech pen.’’ Such a dilemma has become all too commonplace across the country as government officials, claiming a host of competing concerns such as public safety, relegate meaningful public speech to the hinterlands of democracy, physically and figuratively. The use of public space for free speech is hardly ever questioned in principle but finds itself increasingly threatened in practice, and for the reason Masney-Latos and Rose have noted, namely, a disconnection exists in contemporary society between the idea of free speech as a constitutional right and the practice of free speech in a meaningful way. The disjuncture is embodied in our attitudes toward physical space and its relationship to free expression. The physical expression of free speech, speakers’ ability to move fluidly among those with whom they wish to communicate, is symbolic of its robustness to significantly reach the public for whom and by whom free speech is intended. Take the protests against the World Trade Organization and the Free Trade Areas of the Americas summit, staged in Seattle and in Miami, respectively, as examples. While Seattle was subject to the passion that free speech often breeds (Thomas 2000), the city of Miami had learned Seattle’s lesson well. Protesters were restrained from staging their protests within eyesight or earshot of delegates who cut their private deliberations short by a day and took ocean excursions to keep protesters from airing their views (Pain 2003; Nielsen 2003). Indeed, consider the differences in number and practice of public protests in the Vietnam era and those of the war in Iraq. Thus, even as public officials make the exchange of ideas increasingly difficult in physical space, citizens have gradually acculturated to the notion that their voices are no longer necessary or possible. Protest has been physically removed from the sites of commerce and pleasure, and symbolically removed as well in its evisceration, slowly and deliberately by the Supreme Court aided by the","PeriodicalId":439135,"journal":{"name":"Free Speech Yearbook","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122724154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-01-01DOI: 10.1080/08997225.2004.10556295
Recognizing the essential place of free and responsible communication in a democratic society, and recognizing the distinction between the freedoms our legal system should respect and the responsibilities our educational system should cultivate, we members of the National Communication Association 1 endorse the following statement of principles: WE BELIEVE that freedom of speech and assembly must hold a central position among America's constitutional principles, and we express our determined support for the right of peaceful expression by any communicative means available. WE SUPPORT the proposition that a free society can absorb with equanimity speech which exceeds the boundaries of generally accepted beliefs and mores; that much good and little harm can ensue if we err on the side of freedom, whereas much harm and little good may follow if we err on the side of suppression. WE CRITICIZE as misguided those who believe that the justice of their cause confers license to interfere physically and coercively with speech of others, and we condemn intimidation, whether by powerful majorities or strident minorities, which attempts to restrict free expression. WE ACCEPT the responsibility of cultivating by precepts and example, in our classrooms and in our communities, enlightened uses of communication; of developing in our students a respect for precision and accuracy in communication, and for reasoning based upon evidence and a judicious discrimination among values. WE ENCOURAGE our students to accept the role of well-informed and articulate citizens, to defend the communication rights of those with whom they may disagree, and to expose abuses of the communication process. WE DEDICATE ourselves fully to these principles, confident in the belief that reason will ultimately prevail in a free marketplace of ideas. 1 This document originally referred to members of the Speech Association of America and has been updated to reflect a subsequent organizational name change.
{"title":"Credo for Free and Responsible Communication in a Democratic Society","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/08997225.2004.10556295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997225.2004.10556295","url":null,"abstract":"Recognizing the essential place of free and responsible communication in a democratic society, and recognizing the distinction between the freedoms our legal system should respect and the responsibilities our educational system should cultivate, we members of the National Communication Association 1 endorse the following statement of principles: WE BELIEVE that freedom of speech and assembly must hold a central position among America's constitutional principles, and we express our determined support for the right of peaceful expression by any communicative means available. WE SUPPORT the proposition that a free society can absorb with equanimity speech which exceeds the boundaries of generally accepted beliefs and mores; that much good and little harm can ensue if we err on the side of freedom, whereas much harm and little good may follow if we err on the side of suppression. WE CRITICIZE as misguided those who believe that the justice of their cause confers license to interfere physically and coercively with speech of others, and we condemn intimidation, whether by powerful majorities or strident minorities, which attempts to restrict free expression. WE ACCEPT the responsibility of cultivating by precepts and example, in our classrooms and in our communities, enlightened uses of communication; of developing in our students a respect for precision and accuracy in communication, and for reasoning based upon evidence and a judicious discrimination among values. WE ENCOURAGE our students to accept the role of well-informed and articulate citizens, to defend the communication rights of those with whom they may disagree, and to expose abuses of the communication process. WE DEDICATE ourselves fully to these principles, confident in the belief that reason will ultimately prevail in a free marketplace of ideas. 1 This document originally referred to members of the Speech Association of America and has been updated to reflect a subsequent organizational name change.","PeriodicalId":439135,"journal":{"name":"Free Speech Yearbook","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116581273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-01-01DOI: 10.1080/08997225.2004.10556298
Roger Smitter
{"title":"The Development of the NCA Credo for Ethical Communication","authors":"Roger Smitter","doi":"10.1080/08997225.2004.10556298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997225.2004.10556298","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":439135,"journal":{"name":"Free Speech Yearbook","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130049927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-01-01DOI: 10.1080/08997225.2004.10556306
J. Dee
With the ‘‘information superhighway’’ approaching adolescence, certain glaring discrepancies in Internet law are becoming harder and harder to ignore. For example, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998 does not provide immunity for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) who facilitate copyright infringement. In contrast, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996 does provide total immunity to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) who facilitate defamation and even distribution of advertising for child pornography online. It is the thesis of this paper that Congress needs to amend Section 230 of the CDA so that it follows the DMCA model for redress of grievances caused by copyright infringement. The DMCA at least provides for ‘‘notice-and-take-down’’ of material that infringes on a copyright, rather than the blanket immunity that the CDA provides to ISPs and ‘‘users’’ of ‘‘interactive computer services’’ in defamation cases. This discussion will focus on the discrepancies between the CDA and the DMCA, past consequences of these discrepancies in terms of economic harm to individuals, harm to victims of defamation or to copyright holders, and an analysis of the implications of these statutory inconsistencies.
{"title":"“Mere conduits” Or Editors? ISPs, Web Masters, Immunity and Safe Harbor in Online Defamation versus Online Intellectual Property Cases","authors":"J. Dee","doi":"10.1080/08997225.2004.10556306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997225.2004.10556306","url":null,"abstract":"With the ‘‘information superhighway’’ approaching adolescence, certain glaring discrepancies in Internet law are becoming harder and harder to ignore. For example, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998 does not provide immunity for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) who facilitate copyright infringement. In contrast, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996 does provide total immunity to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) who facilitate defamation and even distribution of advertising for child pornography online. It is the thesis of this paper that Congress needs to amend Section 230 of the CDA so that it follows the DMCA model for redress of grievances caused by copyright infringement. The DMCA at least provides for ‘‘notice-and-take-down’’ of material that infringes on a copyright, rather than the blanket immunity that the CDA provides to ISPs and ‘‘users’’ of ‘‘interactive computer services’’ in defamation cases. This discussion will focus on the discrepancies between the CDA and the DMCA, past consequences of these discrepancies in terms of economic harm to individuals, harm to victims of defamation or to copyright holders, and an analysis of the implications of these statutory inconsistencies.","PeriodicalId":439135,"journal":{"name":"Free Speech Yearbook","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115321208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-01-01DOI: 10.1080/08997225.2004.10556302
Harvey C. Jassem
We protect communication and freedom of expression for a multitude of reasons. Free speech as a core value has been linked to our notion of individual growth; a robust marketplace of ideas rewards society with good and better ideas; and the value we call free speech is inherently tied to our belief that in a democratic society it is antithetical to have those who govern limit our ability to know and express. Measures of freedom of expression vary. Absence of government prohibitions on speech is the pivotal measure for some. Others look for an absence of economic barriers to entry or, better yet, the ability to effectively enter and reach the marketplace of ideas, and still others look for the range of diverse ideas/voices/content that is readily available to the audience. However one measures it, there is generally consensus that more freedom of expression is positively associated with more voices in the marketplace, more access to the outlets for effective expression, and more diverse options for the audience. And for most free speech proponents, more is better. In some cases, government intervention in speech related matters serves as a barrier to such freedoms. In others, society is reliant on government intervention to maximize these freedoms. The proper role of government regulation of radio is not entirely settled. Of the mass media, radio has been one of the more democratic forms of public expression. It began in private hands, unregulated by government, and proved so popular and ‘‘easy’’ to broadcast, that government intervention in the name of freedom became necessary. Today there are a multitude of local stations, approximately 13,600, licensed by the federal government (FCC Broadcast Station Totals 2006). On its face, this might indeed suggest that radio is presenting a robust marketplace of ideas. Certainly, there are more radio stations available to most Americans than there are local television stations, newspapers, or even local magazines. There are a large number of radio formats available on those radio stations as well, also suggesting a robust marketplace. Interestingly, however, throughout the history of radio in America there have been a robust band of ‘‘pirates’’ who have taken it upon themselves to violate federal law and taken to the radio airwaves illegally. They tend to rationalize their actions on the premise that radio fails the democratic test without them. Some point to the shrinking number of conglomerate owners. Others note that regardless of who owns the stations, most stations are commercial in nature and hence are programmed in ways that are geared to maximize financial return. Some say that leads to conformity and a diminution of consumer choice. Others point to the paucity of news and public affairs programming on most commercial stations in their indictment of radio as being less than a bastion of free speech values. This paper will discuss American pirate radio as a response to government regulation and the
{"title":"American Pirate Radio—The New Local Radio?","authors":"Harvey C. Jassem","doi":"10.1080/08997225.2004.10556302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997225.2004.10556302","url":null,"abstract":"We protect communication and freedom of expression for a multitude of reasons. Free speech as a core value has been linked to our notion of individual growth; a robust marketplace of ideas rewards society with good and better ideas; and the value we call free speech is inherently tied to our belief that in a democratic society it is antithetical to have those who govern limit our ability to know and express. Measures of freedom of expression vary. Absence of government prohibitions on speech is the pivotal measure for some. Others look for an absence of economic barriers to entry or, better yet, the ability to effectively enter and reach the marketplace of ideas, and still others look for the range of diverse ideas/voices/content that is readily available to the audience. However one measures it, there is generally consensus that more freedom of expression is positively associated with more voices in the marketplace, more access to the outlets for effective expression, and more diverse options for the audience. And for most free speech proponents, more is better. In some cases, government intervention in speech related matters serves as a barrier to such freedoms. In others, society is reliant on government intervention to maximize these freedoms. The proper role of government regulation of radio is not entirely settled. Of the mass media, radio has been one of the more democratic forms of public expression. It began in private hands, unregulated by government, and proved so popular and ‘‘easy’’ to broadcast, that government intervention in the name of freedom became necessary. Today there are a multitude of local stations, approximately 13,600, licensed by the federal government (FCC Broadcast Station Totals 2006). On its face, this might indeed suggest that radio is presenting a robust marketplace of ideas. Certainly, there are more radio stations available to most Americans than there are local television stations, newspapers, or even local magazines. There are a large number of radio formats available on those radio stations as well, also suggesting a robust marketplace. Interestingly, however, throughout the history of radio in America there have been a robust band of ‘‘pirates’’ who have taken it upon themselves to violate federal law and taken to the radio airwaves illegally. They tend to rationalize their actions on the premise that radio fails the democratic test without them. Some point to the shrinking number of conglomerate owners. Others note that regardless of who owns the stations, most stations are commercial in nature and hence are programmed in ways that are geared to maximize financial return. Some say that leads to conformity and a diminution of consumer choice. Others point to the paucity of news and public affairs programming on most commercial stations in their indictment of radio as being less than a bastion of free speech values. This paper will discuss American pirate radio as a response to government regulation and the ","PeriodicalId":439135,"journal":{"name":"Free Speech Yearbook","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121024528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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