In this paper, we willpose more questions than present solutions. We want to raise some questions in the context of the representation of shapes of 3-D objects. One way to get a handle on this problem is to investigate whether labels of shapes and their acquisition reveals any structure of attributes or components of shapes that might be used for representation purposes. Another aspect of the puzzle of representation is the question whether the information is to be stored in analog or propositional form, and at what level this transformation from analog to propositional form takes place.
{"title":"The Problem of Naming Shapes: Vision-Language Interface","authors":"R. Bajcsy, A. Joshi","doi":"10.3115/980262.980287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3115/980262.980287","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we willpose more questions than present solutions. We want to raise some questions in the context of the representation of shapes of 3-D objects. One way to get a handle on this problem is to investigate whether labels of shapes and their acquisition reveals any structure of attributes or components of shapes that might be used for representation purposes. Another aspect of the puzzle of representation is the question whether the information is to be stored in analog or propositional form, and at what level this transformation from analog to propositional form takes place.","PeriodicalId":439225,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Issues In Natural Language Processing","volume":"336 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1978-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123126121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Once an object is introduced into a dicourse, the form of subsequent references to it are strongly governed by convention. This paper discusses how those conventions can be represented for use by a generation facility. A multistage representation is used, allowing decisions to be made when and where the information is available. It is suggested that a specification of rhetorical structure of the intended message should be included with the present syntactic one, and the conventions eventually reformulated in terms of it.
{"title":"Subsequent Reference: Syntactic and Rhetorical Constraints","authors":"David D. McDonald","doi":"10.3115/980262.980273","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3115/980262.980273","url":null,"abstract":"Once <u>an object</u> is introduced into a dicourse, the form of subsequent references to <u>it</u> are strongly governed by convention. This paper discusses how those conventions can be represented for use by a generation facility. A multistage representation is used, allowing decisions to be made when and where the information is available. It is suggested that a specification of rhetorical structure of the intended message should be included with the present syntactic one, and the conventions eventually reformulated in terms of it.","PeriodicalId":439225,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Issues In Natural Language Processing","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1978-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123907930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I have tried to sort out two broad categories of these requirements. The first, cohesion, is hearer oriented. It is the influence on form of the speaker's own assumptions about what the hearer knows at each instant of the communication process. The second, staging, is speaker oriented. It reflects how the speaker calibrates the importance of different parts of what he himself intends to say. I find it helpful to tie down the discussion of both cohesion and staging to differences in linguistic form; there may be other psychological or philosophical overtones to cohesion and staging that have no such direct repercussions, but getting at those overtones is another matter.
{"title":"Topic Levels","authors":"J. Grimes","doi":"10.3115/980262.980279","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3115/980262.980279","url":null,"abstract":"I have tried to sort out two broad categories of these requirements. The first, cohesion, is hearer oriented. It is the influence on form of the speaker's own assumptions about what the hearer knows at each instant of the communication process. The second, staging, is speaker oriented. It reflects how the speaker calibrates the importance of different parts of what he himself intends to say. I find it helpful to tie down the discussion of both cohesion and staging to differences in linguistic form; there may be other psychological or philosophical overtones to cohesion and staging that have no such direct repercussions, but getting at those overtones is another matter.","PeriodicalId":439225,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Issues In Natural Language Processing","volume":"428 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1978-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126081716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ION. The tradition drawn from logic and linguistics is to view the elements of a semantic formalism as logical abstractions--predicates and constants within a logical system. The meaning of a word is a structure o f semantic elements which express the logical truth conditions determining its applicability. For example, if we analyze one sense of "bachelor" as having the semantic components HUMAN, MALE, and UNMARRIED, it is implied that any object to which that sense of the word could be properly applied will fit the truth conditions corresponding to those terms. If "kill" is analyzed as a structure of the form CAUSE(X, DIE(Y)), then we can safely deduce from the fact that "A killed B" that, among other things, B died.
{"title":"On primitives, prototypes, and other semantic anomalies","authors":"T. Winograd","doi":"10.3115/980262.980267","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3115/980262.980267","url":null,"abstract":"ION. The tradition drawn from logic and linguistics is to view the elements of a semantic formalism as logical abstractions--predicates and constants within a logical system. The meaning of a word is a structure o f semantic elements which express the logical truth conditions determining its applicability. For example, if we analyze one sense of \"bachelor\" as having the semantic components HUMAN, MALE, and UNMARRIED, it is implied that any object to which that sense of the word could be properly applied will fit the truth conditions corresponding to those terms. If \"kill\" is analyzed as a structure of the form CAUSE(X, DIE(Y)), then we can safely deduce from the fact that \"A killed B\" that, among other things, B died.","PeriodicalId":439225,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Issues In Natural Language Processing","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1978-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126106220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
c o m p e t e n c e theory of genera t ive grammar, I now wil l s h o w t ha t a pars ing cor re la te of Sub jacency fol lows from t h e s t ruc tu re of the grammar interpreter . Speci f ica l ly , I wil l show tha t there are only l imited cases in which a t r ace g e n e r a t e d by a "MOVE-NP" process can be " l o w e r e d " more than one c lause, i.e. that a t race c rea ted and bound whi le any g iven S is current must almost a lways be a t t a c h e d e i the r to tha t S or to an S which is Dominated by tha t S. Let us begin by examining what i t would mean to lower a t race more than one clause. Given tha t a t race can on ly be " l o w e r e d " by dropping it into the bu f fe r and then c rea t ing a suhord inate S node, as d iscussed above , lower ing a t race more than one clause necessar i l y implies the fo l lowing sequence of events , dep i c ted in f igure 19 be low: First, a t race NP1 must (a) be c rea ted with some S node, $1, as the current S, (b) bound to some NP Dominated by tha t S and then (c) dropped into the buf fer . By r lef in i t ion, i t wil l be inser ted into the f i rst cel l in the buf fer . (This is shown in f igure l g a ) T h e n a second S, $2, must be c r e a t e d , stq~planting $1 as the ct=rrent S, and then y e t a th i rd S, $3, must he c reated, becoming the current S. During all t hese s teps , the t race NP1 remains s i t t ing in the buf fe r . Finally, NP1 is a t tached ¢,nder $3 (fig. 19b). By t h e Spec i f i ed Sub jec t Constraint, NP1 must then a t t ach to $3
既然我们已经了解了泛型语法理论，那么我们现在就来讨论一下，从泛型语法解释器中派生出的从属关系理论是怎样的。Speci f ica l ly,我会展示那只有l模仿案件中,t r a g e n e r t e d由“MOVE-NP”过程可以“l o w e r e d”不止一个c掌声,即t竞赛c rea泰德和绑定任何g埃文S whi勒是当前必须几乎lways t t c h e d e r电子学或年代,考虑的主要是美国让我们开始通过检查我t意味着低种族一个以上的条款。给那t t种族在ly可以“l o w e r e d”下降到布鲁里溃疡f fe r c rea t ing suhord inate年代节点,如d iscussed述,荷兰国际集团(ing)低t竞赛多个条款必要我l y意味着fo l降低的事件序列,取决于我ted c f igure 19低:首先,t竞赛NP1 (a)必须ted c意图与一些节点,1美元,在当前的年代,(b)绑定到一些NP由那年代然后(c)下降到buf拿来。如果将r留在这个位置，它将被插入到缓冲区的第一个单元格中。(如图1a所示)在第2个S中，$2必须在第1个S中生成，然后在第3个S中，$3必须在第3个S中生成，成为当前的S。在所有这5个步骤中，第1个竞赛NP1保持为第1个竞赛NP1，并在缓冲区中生成。最后，NP1为1美分，低于3美元(图19b)。在指定的约束条件下，NP1必须达到$3
{"title":"A Computational Account of Some Constraints on Language","authors":"Mitchell P. Marcus","doi":"10.3115/980262.980302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3115/980262.980302","url":null,"abstract":"c o m p e t e n c e theory of genera t ive grammar, I now wil l s h o w t ha t a pars ing cor re la te of Sub jacency fol lows from t h e s t ruc tu re of the grammar interpreter . Speci f ica l ly , I wil l show tha t there are only l imited cases in which a t r ace g e n e r a t e d by a \"MOVE-NP\" process can be \" l o w e r e d \" more than one c lause, i.e. that a t race c rea ted and bound whi le any g iven S is current must almost a lways be a t t a c h e d e i the r to tha t S or to an S which is Dominated by tha t S. Let us begin by examining what i t would mean to lower a t race more than one clause. Given tha t a t race can on ly be \" l o w e r e d \" by dropping it into the bu f fe r and then c rea t ing a suhord inate S node, as d iscussed above , lower ing a t race more than one clause necessar i l y implies the fo l lowing sequence of events , dep i c ted in f igure 19 be low: First, a t race NP1 must (a) be c rea ted with some S node, $1, as the current S, (b) bound to some NP Dominated by tha t S and then (c) dropped into the buf fer . By r lef in i t ion, i t wil l be inser ted into the f i rst cel l in the buf fer . (This is shown in f igure l g a ) T h e n a second S, $2, must be c r e a t e d , stq~planting $1 as the ct=rrent S, and then y e t a th i rd S, $3, must he c reated, becoming the current S. During all t hese s teps , the t race NP1 remains s i t t ing in the buf fe r . Finally, NP1 is a t tached ¢,nder $3 (fig. 19b). By t h e Spec i f i ed Sub jec t Constraint, NP1 must then a t t ach to $3","PeriodicalId":439225,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Issues In Natural Language Processing","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1978-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123820623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The essence of language is human activity-activity on the part of one individual to make himself understood by another, and activity on the part of that other to understand what was in the mind of the first. These two individuals, the producer and the recipient of language, or as we may more conveniently call them, the speaker and the hearer, and their relations to one another, should never be lost sight of if we want to understand the nature of language and of that part of language which is dealt with in grammar. But in former times this was often overlooked, and words and forms'were often treated as if they were things or natural objects with an existence of their own--a conception which may have been to a great extent fostered through a too exclusive preoccupation with written or printed words, but which is fundamentally false, as will easily be seen with a little reflexion. (p. 17)
{"title":"Toward a Rational Model of Discourse Comprehension","authors":"J. Morgan","doi":"10.3115/980262.980280","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3115/980262.980280","url":null,"abstract":"The essence of language is human activity-activity on the part of one individual to make himself understood by another, and activity on the part of that other to understand what was in the mind of the first. These two individuals, the producer and the recipient of language, or as we may more conveniently call them, the speaker and the hearer, and their relations to one another, should never be lost sight of if we want to understand the nature of language and of that part of language which is dealt with in grammar. But in former times this was often overlooked, and words and forms'were often treated as if they were things or natural objects with an existence of their own--a conception which may have been to a great extent fostered through a too exclusive preoccupation with written or printed words, but which is fundamentally false, as will easily be seen with a little reflexion. (p. 17)","PeriodicalId":439225,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Issues In Natural Language Processing","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1978-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122701030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When a noun phrase or a pronoun occurs in a sentence, i t is frequently appropriate to ask what ent i ty i t refers to, but i t is well known that not all uses of noun phrases and pronouns are referential in this simple sense. In computational approaches to language processing, I believe the main thrust in this area has been toward understanding those referential uses of NP's and pronouns which require the use of both linguist ic and non-linguistic inferences to determine the most plausible referent for the expression. My emphasis in this paper wi l l be somewhat di f ferent. I believe that recent work by l inguists, logicians, and philosophers is leading to convergence on the view that there are two fundamenta l ly dist inct uses of pronouns which have to be treated quite separately: ( i ) a use that corresponds to the logician's use of bound variables, and ( i i ) a use which I wi l l cal l , for want of"a better name, a pragmatic use. I t can be argued that bound variable pronouns are restricted to occurrences in syntactic construction with their antecedents, and are fu l l y interpreted at the level of semantics, while pragmatic pronouns need not have l inguist ic antecedents at a l l , and require pragmatics as well as semantics for their interpretation.
{"title":"Bound Variables and Other Anaphors","authors":"B. Partee","doi":"10.3115/980262.980275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3115/980262.980275","url":null,"abstract":"When a noun phrase or a pronoun occurs in a sentence, i t is frequently appropriate to ask what ent i ty i t refers to, but i t is well known that not all uses of noun phrases and pronouns are referential in this simple sense. In computational approaches to language processing, I believe the main thrust in this area has been toward understanding those referential uses of NP's and pronouns which require the use of both linguist ic and non-linguistic inferences to determine the most plausible referent for the expression. My emphasis in this paper wi l l be somewhat di f ferent. I believe that recent work by l inguists, logicians, and philosophers is leading to convergence on the view that there are two fundamenta l ly dist inct uses of pronouns which have to be treated quite separately: ( i ) a use that corresponds to the logician's use of bound variables, and ( i i ) a use which I wi l l cal l , for want of\"a better name, a pragmatic use. I t can be argued that bound variable pronouns are restricted to occurrences in syntactic construction with their antecedents, and are fu l l y interpreted at the level of semantics, while pragmatic pronouns need not have l inguist ic antecedents at a l l , and require pragmatics as well as semantics for their interpretation.","PeriodicalId":439225,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Issues In Natural Language Processing","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1978-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121115314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper outlines a computational theory of human plausible reasoning constructed from analysis of people's answers to everyday questions. Like logic, the theory is expressed in a content-independent formalism. Unlike logic, the theory specifies how different information in memory affects the certainty of the conclusions drawn. The theory consists of a dimensionalized space of different inference types and their certainty conditions, including a variety of meta-inference types where the inference depends on the person's knowledge about his own knowledge. The protocols from people's answers to questions are analyzed in terms of the different inference types. The paper also discusses how memory is structured in multiple ways to spport the different inference types, and how the information found in memory determines which inference types are triggered.
{"title":"Fragments of a Theory of Human Plausible Reasoning","authors":"A. Collins","doi":"10.3115/980262.980295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3115/980262.980295","url":null,"abstract":"The paper outlines a computational theory of human plausible reasoning constructed from analysis of people's answers to everyday questions. Like logic, the theory is expressed in a content-independent formalism. Unlike logic, the theory specifies how different information in memory affects the certainty of the conclusions drawn. The theory consists of a dimensionalized space of different inference types and their certainty conditions, including a variety of meta-inference types where the inference depends on the person's knowledge about his own knowledge. The protocols from people's answers to questions are analyzed in terms of the different inference types. The paper also discusses how memory is structured in multiple ways to spport the different inference types, and how the information found in memory determines which inference types are triggered.","PeriodicalId":439225,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Issues In Natural Language Processing","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1978-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125574448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is conventional to treat the meaning of an utterance in a discourse in terms of two components, the propositional and the pragmatic or speech act component, the first indicating the meaning of the sentence, the second indicating its intended use by the speaker. Some arguments and evidence are presented to show that these two systems are interdependent. Roughly, it appears that social considerations, primarily status, determine which aspects of a proposition are lexicalized in the utterance. Thus, a child with high status relative to his interlocutor may use a command, "Give me a block", while if he has low status relative to his interlocutor he may use a request, "May I have a block?" If he is an equal, a peer, (and perhaps only then) he will use an explicit true proposition such as, "You have two more than me". Only in this third case is the propositional meaning explicit in the sentence per se, and only in this case is an affirmative or negative response dependent strictly upon truth conditions (on assent rather than compliance).This concept of the social aspects of meaning is examined through an analysis of what is said vs. what is meant in some child-child and teacher-child conversations.
{"title":"Assent and Compliance in Children’s Language Comprehension","authors":"D. Olson","doi":"10.3115/980262.980281","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3115/980262.980281","url":null,"abstract":"It is conventional to treat the meaning of an utterance in a discourse in terms of two components, the propositional and the pragmatic or speech act component, the first indicating the meaning of the sentence, the second indicating its intended use by the speaker. Some arguments and evidence are presented to show that these two systems are interdependent. Roughly, it appears that social considerations, primarily status, determine which aspects of a proposition are lexicalized in the utterance. Thus, a child with high status relative to his interlocutor may use a command, \"Give me a block\", while if he has low status relative to his interlocutor he may use a request, \"May I have a block?\" If he is an equal, a peer, (and perhaps only then) he will use an explicit true proposition such as, \"You have two more than me\". Only in this third case is the propositional meaning explicit in the sentence per se, and only in this case is an affirmative or negative response dependent strictly upon truth conditions (on assent rather than compliance).This concept of the social aspects of meaning is examined through an analysis of what is said vs. what is meant in some child-child and teacher-child conversations.","PeriodicalId":439225,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Issues In Natural Language Processing","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1978-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133262521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes principles of human conversation based on the conversational goals of the participants. Several conversational rules are proposed that seem crucial to the process of interpreting and generating conversations. These rules, as well as other aspects of the conversation process, are embodied in MICS, a computer program that generates one side of a conversation. The process model underlying MICS, and some illustrative output, are presented.
{"title":"Intentionality and human conversations","authors":"J. Carbonell","doi":"10.3115/980262.980284","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3115/980262.980284","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes principles of human conversation based on the conversational goals of the participants. Several conversational rules are proposed that seem crucial to the process of interpreting and generating conversations. These rules, as well as other aspects of the conversation process, are embodied in MICS, a computer program that generates one side of a conversation. The process model underlying MICS, and some illustrative output, are presented.","PeriodicalId":439225,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Issues In Natural Language Processing","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1978-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126138008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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