Pub Date : 2026-10-31DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00800-6
Alessandra Buccella
{"title":"Interaction, not dissection: reframing AI interpretability","authors":"Alessandra Buccella","doi":"10.1007/s13194-026-00800-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-026-00800-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"503 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149293006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-10-30DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00793-2
Friedel Weinert
{"title":"A structural account of quantum propensities","authors":"Friedel Weinert","doi":"10.1007/s13194-026-00793-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-026-00793-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149287858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-10-30DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00798-x
Martin Justin, Borut Trpin
Industry funding is often indispensable to scientific research, but it can also introduce systematic biases that align study outcomes with commercial interests. Recent philosophical work suggests treating funding disclosures as meta-evidence: evidence about the evidential force of first-order study results. This paper asks whether such meta-evidence can be used to improve collective inquiry. Using an agent-based model, we compare two strategies for aggregating evidence in the presence of industry sponsorship: down-weighting industry-funded results and adjusting them relative to publicly funded studies. The simulations show that both strategies are highly context-sensitive. Relative adjustment can correct for bias when public evidence is reliable and sufficiently broad, but it falls short when public data are noisy or sparse. Down-weighting depends on a difficult and partly arbitrary choice of discount weight. The results suggest that industry sponsorship can be epistemically relevant meta-evidence without yielding a straightforward rule for evidence aggregation.
{"title":"Industry sponsorship as meta-evidence: a simulation study","authors":"Martin Justin, Borut Trpin","doi":"10.1007/s13194-026-00798-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-026-00798-x","url":null,"abstract":"Industry funding is often indispensable to scientific research, but it can also introduce systematic biases that align study outcomes with commercial interests. Recent philosophical work suggests treating funding disclosures as meta-evidence: evidence about the evidential force of first-order study results. This paper asks whether such meta-evidence can be used to improve collective inquiry. Using an agent-based model, we compare two strategies for aggregating evidence in the presence of industry sponsorship: down-weighting industry-funded results and adjusting them relative to publicly funded studies. The simulations show that both strategies are highly context-sensitive. Relative adjustment can correct for bias when public evidence is reliable and sufficiently broad, but it falls short when public data are noisy or sparse. Down-weighting depends on a difficult and partly arbitrary choice of discount weight. The results suggest that industry sponsorship can be epistemically relevant meta-evidence without yielding a straightforward rule for evidence aggregation.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149287857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-10-29DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00803-3
Yuqi Xing
{"title":"The systemic teleological turn in biological function: the alien and cavefish cases","authors":"Yuqi Xing","doi":"10.1007/s13194-026-00803-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-026-00803-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149291163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-10-29DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00801-5
Nga Wing Tsang
Hasok Chang, in Realism for Realistic People , articulates a novel form of pragmatic realism, in which he defines “truth” and “reality” in terms of “operational coherence.” I observe, however, that Chang’s treatment of the “reality” of the controversial theoretical entity, “ether,” is ambiguous. More importantly, the ether case reveals structural tensions internal to pragmatic realism. First, pragmatic realism has to accept that mutually exclusive hypotheses about the ether were both true to a certain extent, and hence allow the ether to count as real to a certain extent despite attributing incompatible properties to it. This weakens the constraint role assigned to the “mind-uncontrolled reality.” Second, pragmatic realism lacks a threshold of incoherence for determining when the ether was an “unreal” entity and relevant hypotheses were “false.” This renders the notions “falsity” and “unreal” superfluous, and hence they fail to guide our choices. Third, I argue that pragmatic realism faces a dilemma. On the one hand, if “operational coherence” can be evaluated across systems of practice, it follows that the ether is unreal. This sits uneasily with Chang’s pluralism. On the other hand, if “operational coherence” can only be evaluated relative to a given system, the reality of the ether and the truth of relevant propositions are dependent on our choice of system. This sits uneasily with Chang’s intended form of “realism.” Together, these three problems reveal a structural instability within pragmatic realism.
{"title":"Resisting Hasok Chang’s pragmatic realism via the case of the ether in the 19th century","authors":"Nga Wing Tsang","doi":"10.1007/s13194-026-00801-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-026-00801-5","url":null,"abstract":"Hasok Chang, in <jats:italic>Realism for Realistic People</jats:italic> , articulates a novel form of pragmatic realism, in which he defines “truth” and “reality” in terms of “operational coherence.” I observe, however, that Chang’s treatment of the “reality” of the controversial theoretical entity, “ether,” is ambiguous. More importantly, the ether case reveals structural tensions internal to pragmatic realism. First, pragmatic realism has to accept that mutually exclusive hypotheses about the ether were both true to a certain extent, and hence allow the ether to count as real to a certain extent despite attributing incompatible properties to it. This weakens the constraint role assigned to the “mind-uncontrolled reality.” Second, pragmatic realism lacks a threshold of incoherence for determining when the ether was an “unreal” entity and relevant hypotheses were “false.” This renders the notions “falsity” and “unreal” superfluous, and hence they fail to guide our choices. Third, I argue that pragmatic realism faces a dilemma. On the one hand, if “operational coherence” can be evaluated across systems of practice, it follows that the ether is unreal. This sits uneasily with Chang’s pluralism. On the other hand, if “operational coherence” can only be evaluated relative to a given system, the reality of the ether and the truth of relevant propositions are dependent on our choice of system. This sits uneasily with Chang’s intended form of “realism.” Together, these three problems reveal a structural instability within pragmatic realism.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149290791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-10-29DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00795-0
Johannes Nyström
{"title":"Correction to: How to estimate the success chance of a scientific theory? On the no miracles argument and the base rate fallacy","authors":"Johannes Nyström","doi":"10.1007/s13194-026-00795-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-026-00795-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149290790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-10-19DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00797-y
Ludo L. J. Schoenmakers
{"title":"Correction to: Scientific understanding and the controversy over adaptationism in evolutionary biology","authors":"Ludo L. J. Schoenmakers","doi":"10.1007/s13194-026-00797-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-026-00797-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"497 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149221385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-10-15DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00796-z
Tadej Todorović,Janez Bregant
Abstract What should the public understand about climate change to form true beliefs and responsibly participate in democratic deliberation? We argue for a partly negative and partly positive answer. Negatively, the public does not need to understand the climate or first-order evidence in climate science: endeavors that pursue such first-order competence, such as mainstream critical thinking (CT) and logic-based inoculation strategies task non-experts with a demand they cannot reliably perform. We demonstrate this by applying such inoculation procedures to a sophisticated and credentialed argument against climate change, and show that encouraging non-experts to evaluate the first-order premises and scientific claims leads to epistemic trespassing. Positively, we argue that what the public actually needs for responsible participation in the climate debate is a more modest and attainable understanding of the social epistemology of science – understanding how the scientific consensus is formed and why the process is more reliable than the alternatives. This kind of understanding transforms blind reliance into rationally warranted trust. In doing so, we distinguish the process of higher-order critical assessment, the understanding it gives, and the calibrated deference it licenses, and we locate higher-order evidence on the side of warranted trust rather than first-order understanding. The result is an epistemically responsible framework for public engagement with climate science that redirects, rather than abandons, critical thinking.
{"title":"The limits of critical thinking: climate skepticism, epistemic trespassing, and the understanding that grounds trust","authors":"Tadej Todorović,Janez Bregant","doi":"10.1007/s13194-026-00796-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-026-00796-z","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What should the public understand about climate change to form true beliefs and responsibly participate in democratic deliberation? We argue for a partly negative and partly positive answer. Negatively, the public does not need to understand the climate or first-order evidence in climate science: endeavors that pursue such first-order competence, such as mainstream critical thinking (CT) and logic-based inoculation strategies task non-experts with a demand they cannot reliably perform. We demonstrate this by applying such inoculation procedures to a sophisticated and credentialed argument against climate change, and show that encouraging non-experts to evaluate the first-order premises and scientific claims leads to epistemic trespassing. Positively, we argue that what the public actually needs for responsible participation in the climate debate is a more modest and attainable understanding of the social epistemology of science – understanding how the scientific consensus is formed and why the process is more reliable than the alternatives. This kind of understanding transforms blind reliance into rationally warranted trust. In doing so, we distinguish the process of higher-order critical assessment, the understanding it gives, and the calibrated deference it licenses, and we locate higher-order evidence on the side of warranted trust rather than first-order understanding. The result is an epistemically responsible framework for public engagement with climate science that redirects, rather than abandons, critical thinking.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"73 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149210825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-10-10DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00794-1
Alex LeBrun
{"title":"Putnam on mathematics and ontological commitment","authors":"Alex LeBrun","doi":"10.1007/s13194-026-00794-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-026-00794-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"90 3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149151771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-10-10DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00790-5
Ziren Yang, Jiyuan Li
Current projects in synthetic biology, universal biology, and the origin-of-life study have posed a pressing issue regarding the nature of biological possibility. This essay proposes a novel account of biological possibility, which highlights the role of mechanism: X is biologically possible just in case there is a possible life-defining or life-participating mechanism that actualizes X, and such mechanisms determine the features that individuate X. This mechanistic account captures a broad scope of biological possibilities while affording sufficient constraints in delivering them, thus being superior to three previous accounts (the “Library of Mendel,” combinatorial, and law-based accounts).
{"title":"Biological possibility: a mechanistic account","authors":"Ziren Yang, Jiyuan Li","doi":"10.1007/s13194-026-00790-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-026-00790-5","url":null,"abstract":"Current projects in synthetic biology, universal biology, and the origin-of-life study have posed a pressing issue regarding the nature of biological possibility. This essay proposes a novel account of biological possibility, which highlights the role of mechanism: X is biologically possible just in case there is a possible life-defining or life-participating mechanism that actualizes X, and such mechanisms determine the features that individuate X. This mechanistic account captures a broad scope of biological possibilities while affording sufficient constraints in delivering them, thus being superior to three previous accounts (the “Library of Mendel,” combinatorial, and law-based accounts).","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149151766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：