Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-11-08DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102477
Fulya Y. Ersoy
Beliefs are a critical component of economic decision-making. Since they are not directly observable, they are generally elicited through survey questions. Hence, it is important to know whether and how incentivization affects the elicited beliefs. Using an experiment, this paper tests the effect of incentivized versus unincentivized belief elicitation on students’ beliefs about returns to effort in an educational setting. Initially, incentivization significantly reduces the bias in beliefs, without impacting the accuracy of beliefs. It also reduces the frequency of round answers and increases time spent responding to the belief questions, both of which suggest increased effort. However, these initial effects on bias and response times diminish or become nonexistent in later weeks, suggesting short-lived effects.
{"title":"Do incentives matter in elicitation of beliefs?","authors":"Fulya Y. Ersoy","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102477","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102477","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Beliefs are a critical component of economic decision-making. Since they are not directly observable, they are generally elicited through survey questions. Hence, it is important to know whether and how incentivization affects the elicited beliefs. Using an experiment, this paper tests the effect of incentivized versus unincentivized belief elicitation on students’ beliefs about returns to effort in an educational setting. Initially, incentivization significantly reduces the <em>bias</em> in beliefs, without impacting the <em>accuracy</em> of beliefs. It also reduces the frequency of round answers and increases time spent responding to the belief questions, both of which suggest increased effort. However, these initial effects on bias and response times diminish or become nonexistent in later weeks, suggesting short-lived effects.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102477"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145579151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We experimentally examine how bargainers’ social preferences shape a powerless third party’s well-being when they can appropriate and redistribute its endowment. We explore two sources of social preferences: the feature of our taking game that enables bargainers to unilaterally enforce fairness without the fear of efficiency loss, and four non-monetary interventions aimed at increasing bargainers’ moral costs. We find that fewer than 10 percent of proposals are fair to the third party, yet around 40 percent of bargaining outcomes are fair — mainly because over 80 percent of those fair outcomes result from responders rejecting proposals unfair to the third party. This highlights the importance of unilateral enforcement in promoting fairness. In contrast, non-monetary interventions show minimal impact, suggesting a need for more effective design, possibly involving public visibility or stronger normative framing. Overall, the findings emphasize the role of institutions that enable individuals to ensure fairness for vulnerable parties without sacrificing efficiency.
{"title":"Bargaining over taking from a powerless third party: The role of social preferences","authors":"Haimanti Bhattacharya , Subhasish Dugar , Sumit Sarkar","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102429","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102429","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We experimentally examine how bargainers’ social preferences shape a powerless third party’s well-being when they can appropriate and redistribute its endowment. We explore two sources of social preferences: the feature of our taking game that enables bargainers to unilaterally enforce fairness without the fear of efficiency loss, and four non-monetary interventions aimed at increasing bargainers’ moral costs. We find that fewer than 10 percent of proposals are fair to the third party, yet around 40 percent of bargaining outcomes are fair — mainly because over 80 percent of those fair outcomes result from responders rejecting proposals unfair to the third party. This highlights the importance of unilateral enforcement in promoting fairness. In contrast, non-monetary interventions show minimal impact, suggesting a need for more effective design, possibly involving public visibility or stronger normative framing. Overall, the findings emphasize the role of institutions that enable individuals to ensure fairness for vulnerable parties without sacrificing efficiency.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102429"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145018393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-10-28DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102473
Magdalena Adamus , Martin Guzi , Eva Ballová Mikušková
The paper investigates gender biases and differential treatment of women and men in the business start-up phase. A sample of 498 entrepreneurs from Slovakia participated in an online experiment and evaluated three fictitious business plans in terms of the applicants’ competence, likeability, and business ability. Evaluators also indicated the survival chances of each planned business, the amount they would be willing to invest in each of the start-ups, and selected the most promising applicant. The start-ups were positioned in three different sectors—cosmetics production, services provision, and software development—where men’s and women’s chances of success may be viewed differently. Following Goldberg’s paradigm, half of the evaluators received business plans presented as written by female and half by male applicants; otherwise the plans were identical. Although our results show that, in general, female applicants are assessed similarly to male applicants, masculine evaluators assess women’s business plans and their potential in entrepreneurship more critically. Finally, the study shows that caution is advised when recommending to increase the number of female evaluators of business plans at various stages of the evaluation process. If women who become involved in entrepreneurship are excessively masculine and masculinity is associated with a less favourable evaluation of potential female entrepreneurs, such policies could backfire against women, putting them in a more disadvantaged position.
{"title":"Evaluators’ masculine gender identity may drive gender biases in peer evaluation of business plans","authors":"Magdalena Adamus , Martin Guzi , Eva Ballová Mikušková","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102473","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102473","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The paper investigates gender biases and differential treatment of women and men in the business start-up phase. A sample of 498 entrepreneurs from Slovakia participated in an online experiment and evaluated three fictitious business plans in terms of the applicants’ competence, likeability, and business ability. Evaluators also indicated the survival chances of each planned business, the amount they would be willing to invest in each of the start-ups, and selected the most promising applicant. The start-ups were positioned in three different sectors—cosmetics production, services provision, and software development—where men’s and women’s chances of success may be viewed differently. Following Goldberg’s paradigm, half of the evaluators received business plans presented as written by female and half by male applicants; otherwise the plans were identical. Although our results show that, in general, female applicants are assessed similarly to male applicants, masculine evaluators assess women’s business plans and their potential in entrepreneurship more critically. Finally, the study shows that caution is advised when recommending to increase the number of female evaluators of business plans at various stages of the evaluation process. If women who become involved in entrepreneurship are excessively masculine and masculinity is associated with a less favourable evaluation of potential female entrepreneurs, such policies could backfire against women, putting them in a more disadvantaged position.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102473"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145465651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-10-24DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102470
Yuki Higuchi , Vu Hoang Nam , Tetsushi Sonobe
Coordination is crucial for effective collective action; however, it is often challenging to achieve. Understanding the factors that facilitate coordination is particularly relevant for firms that require coordinated efforts for efficient production. In this study, we conducted an incentivized four-person minimum effort game involving 45 Vietnamese firms. Although games have been widely studied, they are typically conducted in laboratory settings. This study is the first to implement the game in real firms, where we invited an owner-manager and three randomly selected workers from each firm. In this game, the payoff depends positively on the minimum effort of the four players and negatively on their own efforts. During the first five rounds, when communication was prohibited, all firms were trapped in coordination failure, with low effort being made. However, when communication was allowed, many firms achieved a Pareto-efficient equilibrium with the highest level of effort in the subsequent five rounds. Importantly, firms that frequently communicate in their daily operations were more likely to achieve successful coordination. Workers in such firms adhere to the owner-manager’s suggestions regarding their level of effort. These findings highlight the importance of communication in facilitating coordination among firms.
{"title":"Communication and coordination in firms:A lab-in-the-field experiment with small manufacturers in Vietnam","authors":"Yuki Higuchi , Vu Hoang Nam , Tetsushi Sonobe","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102470","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102470","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Coordination is crucial for effective collective action; however, it is often challenging to achieve. Understanding the factors that facilitate coordination is particularly relevant for firms that require coordinated efforts for efficient production. In this study, we conducted an incentivized four-person minimum effort game involving 45 Vietnamese firms. Although games have been widely studied, they are typically conducted in laboratory settings. This study is the first to implement the game in real firms, where we invited an owner-manager and three randomly selected workers from each firm. In this game, the payoff depends positively on the minimum effort of the four players and negatively on their own efforts. During the first five rounds, when communication was prohibited, all firms were trapped in coordination failure, with low effort being made. However, when communication was allowed, many firms achieved a Pareto-efficient equilibrium with the highest level of effort in the subsequent five rounds. Importantly, firms that frequently communicate in their daily operations were more likely to achieve successful coordination. Workers in such firms adhere to the owner-manager’s suggestions regarding their level of effort. These findings highlight the importance of communication in facilitating coordination among firms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102470"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145465650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-09-19DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102435
Magnus Våge Knutsen
I investigate the interaction between two solutions to the moral hazard problem in experience goods markets: Quality verification and reputational concerns. I set up an experimental market where a long-lived seller interacts with a sequence of short-lived buyers and where buyers observe previous decisions by sellers. I test the effect of letting buyers verify product quality at a cost in two distinctly different environments: One in which reputational concerns for sellers are induced by way of computerized sellers, and one without induced reputational concerns. My equilibrium analysis shows that with induced reputational concerns, costly quality verification may fully crowd out reputational concerns and lead to inferior market outcomes. However, when reputational concerns are not induced, verification can improve market outcomes. Results from the experiment to some extent corroborate these predictions. First, in the environment where reputational concerns are induced, short-run incentives created by verification almost fully crowd out the reputational concerns. Second, in the environment without induced reputational concerns, verification improves market outcomes by increasing quality and overall market surplus.
{"title":"Verification and reputational concerns: An experiment","authors":"Magnus Våge Knutsen","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102435","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102435","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>I investigate the interaction between two solutions to the moral hazard problem in experience goods markets: Quality verification and reputational concerns. I set up an experimental market where a long-lived seller interacts with a sequence of short-lived buyers and where buyers observe previous decisions by sellers. I test the effect of letting buyers verify product quality at a cost in two distinctly different environments: One in which reputational concerns for sellers are induced by way of computerized sellers, and one without induced reputational concerns. My equilibrium analysis shows that with induced reputational concerns, costly quality verification may fully crowd out reputational concerns and lead to inferior market outcomes. However, when reputational concerns are not induced, verification can improve market outcomes. Results from the experiment to some extent corroborate these predictions. First, in the environment where reputational concerns are induced, short-run incentives created by verification almost fully crowd out the reputational concerns. Second, in the environment without induced reputational concerns, verification improves market outcomes by increasing quality and overall market surplus.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102435"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145104974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01Epub Date: 2025-07-12DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102404
Bjorn Van Campenhout , Leocardia Nabwire
Haggling over prices is a common feature of economic transactions in many societies. This study examines whether the gender of the seller influences buyers’ negotiation strategies and outcomes in bilateral price bargaining. Using a bargaining experiment in eastern Uganda, we analyze interactions between smallholder maize farmers and either a male or female seed seller. Our findings reveal that buyers negotiating with female sellers are less likely to accept the initial offer price and respond with lower counter-bids compared to those bargaining with male sellers. Negotiations also last, on average, one round longer when the seller is a woman, and final transaction prices are nearly 9 percent lower. These results are particularly relevant for rural economies, where restrictive gender norms limit women’s financial autonomy. Given that small agribusinesses often provide one of the few viable income-generating opportunities for women, gender biases in market interactions can have substantial implications for economic empowerment and household welfare.
{"title":"Buyer-side gender discrimination in bargaining: Evidence from seed sales in Uganda","authors":"Bjorn Van Campenhout , Leocardia Nabwire","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102404","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102404","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Haggling over prices is a common feature of economic transactions in many societies. This study examines whether the gender of the seller influences buyers’ negotiation strategies and outcomes in bilateral price bargaining. Using a bargaining experiment in eastern Uganda, we analyze interactions between smallholder maize farmers and either a male or female seed seller. Our findings reveal that buyers negotiating with female sellers are less likely to accept the initial offer price and respond with lower counter-bids compared to those bargaining with male sellers. Negotiations also last, on average, one round longer when the seller is a woman, and final transaction prices are nearly 9 percent lower. These results are particularly relevant for rural economies, where restrictive gender norms limit women’s financial autonomy. Given that small agribusinesses often provide one of the few viable income-generating opportunities for women, gender biases in market interactions can have substantial implications for economic empowerment and household welfare.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102404"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144654310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
If a government highlighted the first producer to adopt green technology, how would the remaining producers react? This study is the first attempt to evaluate the impact of a message about a climate leader sent by the government to an industry. From among 374 wineries in Japan, half were randomly selected and received a message stating that a certain winery was an early adopter of renewable energy. We then observed whether other wineries participated in webinars on carbon footprint measurement to collect information. We find that this message about climate leadership did not encourage the wineries to participate in the webinar. We interpret this result as reflecting both the strategic decisions of competing wineries and the adverse psychological effects of the message. Further analysis reveals a substantial gap between the stated interest and actual participation, suggesting that self-reported intentions may not reliably predict behavior. Overall, this preregistered field experiment highlights the importance of carefully designing supply-side messaging policies and emphasizes the value of collecting behavioral data in real-world settings to better understand actual responses.
{"title":"When leadership messaging fails to encourage producers’ climate action: Field experiments reveal what works in the real world","authors":"Hide-Fumi Yokoo , Takahiro Kubo , Daisuke Kunii , Hiroki Sasaki","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102439","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102439","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>If a government highlighted the first producer to adopt green technology, how would the remaining producers react? This study is the first attempt to evaluate the impact of a message about a climate leader sent by the government to an industry. From among 374 wineries in Japan, half were randomly selected and received a message stating that a certain winery was an early adopter of renewable energy. We then observed whether other wineries participated in webinars on carbon footprint measurement to collect information. We find that this message about climate leadership did not encourage the wineries to participate in the webinar. We interpret this result as reflecting both the strategic decisions of competing wineries and the adverse psychological effects of the message. Further analysis reveals a substantial gap between the stated interest and actual participation, suggesting that self-reported intentions may not reliably predict behavior. Overall, this preregistered field experiment highlights the importance of carefully designing supply-side messaging policies and emphasizes the value of collecting behavioral data in real-world settings to better understand actual responses.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102439"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145105009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The war in Ukraine has displaced over 6.4 million Ukrainians to neighboring countries. This study investigates the return intentions of Ukrainian refugees, focusing on national identity and pride as psychological factors. Using a large-scale experimental survey, we examined how increasing the salience of these factors affects return decisions. Our findings show that making national identity more salient slightly increases the desire to return, while making pride more salient decreases it, particularly among those with lower pride levels. These results suggest that interventions enhancing national identity could promote return migration, but pride-based strategies should be used cautiously. The study contributes to the literature on forced displacement and identity economics, providing policy insights for facilitating the return of war refugees.
{"title":"Return intentions of Ukrainian refugees: The role of national identity and pride","authors":"Volodymyr Vakhitov , Nataliia Zaika , Serhiy Kandul","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102455","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102455","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The war in Ukraine has displaced over 6.4 million Ukrainians to neighboring countries. This study investigates the return intentions of Ukrainian refugees, focusing on national identity and pride as psychological factors. Using a large-scale experimental survey, we examined how increasing the salience of these factors affects return decisions. Our findings show that making national identity more salient slightly increases the desire to return, while making pride more salient decreases it, particularly among those with lower pride levels. These results suggest that interventions enhancing national identity could promote return migration, but pride-based strategies should be used cautiously. The study contributes to the literature on forced displacement and identity economics, providing policy insights for facilitating the return of war refugees.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"119 ","pages":"Article 102455"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145319917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-01Epub Date: 2025-08-14DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102427
Musa Hasen Ahmed , Wondimagegn Mesfin Tesfaye
We examine the link between road accessibility and the use of maternal healthcare services in Ethiopia. Using a quasi-experimental design, we compare maternal health outcomes in villages before and after road construction alongside control villages without such infrastructure. Our analysis suggests that rural road development is associated with increased utilization of maternal healthcare services during the prenatal stage. However, we did not observe significant associations during the birth or postnatal stages. Using data collected before the commencement of the road expansion program, we confirm that the observed association between road access and maternal healthcare utilization can be attributed to the road infrastructure rather than to pre-existing conditions in the villages.
{"title":"Infrastructure-driven healthcare advancements: Rural Roads and Maternal Health in Ethiopia","authors":"Musa Hasen Ahmed , Wondimagegn Mesfin Tesfaye","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102427","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102427","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the link between road accessibility and the use of maternal healthcare services in Ethiopia. Using a quasi-experimental design, we compare maternal health outcomes in villages before and after road construction alongside control villages without such infrastructure. Our analysis suggests that rural road development is associated with increased utilization of maternal healthcare services during the prenatal stage. However, we did not observe significant associations during the birth or postnatal stages. Using data collected before the commencement of the road expansion program, we confirm that the observed association between road access and maternal healthcare utilization can be attributed to the road infrastructure rather than to pre-existing conditions in the villages.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 102427"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144908620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-10-01Epub Date: 2025-09-02DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2025.102432
Yasuhiro Nakamoto
In this study, we investigate earnings as a motivational tool on goal setting in economically equivalent gain and loss domains. The main finding indicates that a higher unit price, which corresponds to greater earnings, leads to a higher self-set goal in the Gain treatment but not in the economically equivalent Loss treatment. Using the reference-dependent utility model, one possible explanation is that in the loss domain, the positive effect of an increase in the unit price is weakened due to a corresponding change in the reference point formed by the initial endowment. Additionally, a higher unit price does not lead to greater performance in both the gain and loss domains. Finally, in the gain domain, our experiment finds that low rewards fail to motivate individuals to set goals that closely align with actual performance.
{"title":"The effect of an increase in unit price on self-set goals in a success-based fee system: Gain and loss domains","authors":"Yasuhiro Nakamoto","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102432","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.socec.2025.102432","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this study, we investigate earnings as a motivational tool on goal setting in economically equivalent gain and loss domains. The main finding indicates that a higher unit price, which corresponds to greater earnings, leads to a higher self-set goal in the Gain treatment but not in the economically equivalent Loss treatment. Using the reference-dependent utility model, one possible explanation is that in the loss domain, the positive effect of an increase in the unit price is weakened due to a corresponding change in the reference point formed by the initial endowment. Additionally, a higher unit price does not lead to greater performance in both the gain and loss domains. Finally, in the gain domain, our experiment finds that low rewards fail to motivate individuals to set goals that closely align with actual performance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":"118 ","pages":"Article 102432"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145003875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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