Politics & Policy最新文献

This study extends the political business cycle framework by emphasizing incumbents' electoral expectations as a key influence on fiscal behavior. Conventional models assume that politicians increase spending or reduce taxes before elections to maximize voter support. Yet incumbents rarely act under full uncertainty; their choices depend on perceived chances of reelection drawn from polls, past results, and other political signals. Focusing on local governments, this study argues that confident incumbents should moderate opportunistic spending, while those facing electoral risk intensify it. Evidence from South Korean municipalities shows that election periods are marked by weakened financial conditions. However, even incumbents with strong prospects continue expansionary behavior, suggesting they seek to reduce electoral uncertainty. Progressive executives tend to finance spending with debt, while conservatives rely on liquidity adjustments. Term-limited officials exhibit limited cyclical behavior. These results indicate that fiscal manipulation reflects not only electoral timing but also how incumbents interpret uncertainty.

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Pulatov, Abdullo, & Ahmad Hassan Ahmad. 2021. “Political Business Cycles in Post-Communist European Countries.” Politics & Policy 49(5): 1248–1269. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12427.

Adra, Samer. 2022. “Monetary Policy and Anxious Presidents: The Effects of Monetary Shocks on Presidential Job Approval.” Politics & Policy 50(2): 244–273. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12456.

Cho, Sungdai, and Garry Young. 2008. “The Asymmetric Impact of Inflation on Presidential Approval.” Politics & Policy 30(3): 401–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2002.tb00128.x.

This study identifies how political mechanisms drive opportunistic fiscal behavior depending on whether fiscal authority is centralized or decentralized. Drawing on two theoretical mechanisms—political budget cycles and electoral competition—we investigate how the dominant mechanism of opportunism varies across levels of fiscal authority. We test these mechanisms in the context of local tax cuts in South Korea, where both central and local governments can implement tax reductions. Our findings show strong support for the political budget cycle hypothesis when the central government determines local tax cuts, with tax reductions increasing significantly as elections approach. However, electoral competition does not influence central government tax policy, likely because national policies are uniform and cannot target individual localities. In contrast, local governments exhibit heterogeneity—political opportunism is more pronounced in electorally competitive districts. These results suggest that local fiscal autonomy can either constrain or amplify political opportunism, depending on electoral incentives.

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Lee, Yunsoo. 2026. “Untangling the Relationship Between Fiscal Decentralization and Citizen Participation: A Critical Revisit.” Politics & Policy 54, no. 1: e70121. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.70121.

Oumbe, Honoré Tekam, Borice Augustin Ngounou, Edmond Noubissi Domguia, Malonne Hyppolite Ngnie, and Thierry Messie Pondie. 2025. “Does Fiscal Decentralization Kill Inclusive Growth? Evidence From African Countries.” Politics & Policy 53, no. 6: e70076. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.70076.

Ike, Vivian. 2020. “The Impact of Veto Players on Incremental and Drastic Policy Making: Australia's Carbon Tax Policy and Its Repeal.” Politics & Policy 48, no. 2: 232–264. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12346.

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed a sharp divergence in governance performance: nations whose leaders prioritized power and self-interest over transparency and accountability experienced worse health outcomes, slower evidence uptake, and higher excess mortality—failures rooted not in resources but in leadership credibility and politicized science. In response, this paper proposes a hybrid AI-human governance framework designed as a structural constraint on these failures. The AI layer, built for radical transparency and equitable resource allocation, would be sheltered from elite capture. Yet AI is not inherently benevolent: if designed to serve entrenched Western elites, it risks amplifying inequities and automating authoritarianism. If grounded in democratic oversight, Global South representation, and binding transparency, AI can become a corrective force—auditing bias and protecting clinical autonomy. The outcome depends not on technology alone but on deliberate design choices today. We call for urgent action to ensure post-pandemic reform builds resilient, equitable, and accountable systems capable of withstanding both future pathogens and the pathologies of power.

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Myers, Nathan, Ann Pendergast, Alyssa Tidmore, Gage Atwood, Heather Alexander, Brian Williamson, & Danielle Hohman. 2025. “Roles in Resilience: The Intersection of Genetic Counseling, Policy Advocacy, and Community Resilience.” Politics & Policy 53(2): e70023. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.70023.

Falkenström, Erica, and Rebecca Selberg. 2025. “Ethical Problems and the Role of Expertise in Health Policy: A Case Study of Public Policy Making in Sweden During COVID-19.” Politics & Policy 53(1): e12646. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12646.

Chao, Chia-An, & Nathan Myers. 2018. “State Biotechnology and Genomic Development: Critical Resources and Barriers.” Politics & Policy 46(6): 985–1016. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12279.

This paper aims to examine (i) the influence of the perception of corruption among religious service providers on citizens' trust in customary service providers, and (ii) the influence of the perception of corruption among customary service providers on citizens' trust in religious service providers in Africa. The analysis is based on a sample of 48,804 citizens living in 34 African countries, drawn from the 8th round of the Afrobarometer. The econometric results, obtained using an ordered probit model with an endogenous covariate, show that the perception of corruption among religious service providers significantly reduces trust in customary service providers. On the other hand, the perception of corruption among customary service providers significantly reduces trust in religious service providers. Corruption of police and justice also reduces trust in religious and customary service providers. Moreover, trust in customary service providers significantly increases trust in religious service providers. This suggests that religious services and customary services are complementary for African citizens.

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Hiroi, T., and G. S. Schober. 2023. “Corruption, Patronage, and Avertable Child Deaths in Developing Countries.” Politics & Policy 51, no. 6: 1174–1194. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12568.

Iheonu, C. O. 2025. “Terror, Output, and Institutions in Africa.” Politics & Policy 53, no. 5: e70067. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.70067.

Lagunes, P. F. 2012. “Corruption's Challenge to Democracy: A Review of the Issues.” Politics & Policy 40, no. 5: 802–826. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00384.x.

This study examines how institutional arrangements associated with economic security reshape semiconductor production in East Asia through the case of TSMC's investment in Kumamoto, Japan. It argues that economic security operates not primarily through direct administrative control, but by redefining acceptable investment risks, narrowing firms' feasible location choices, providing conditional financial support, and coordinating policy across levels of government. The JASM case shows that local governments play a key role in coordinating project implementation and buffering local adjustment pressures. The investment has intensified pressures related to land prices, labor supply, and public infrastructure, revealing how the uneven distribution of benefits and costs may constrain the long-term sustainability of security-driven re-regionalization.

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Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka. 2025. “Japan's Economic Security: Policy Development Under the Influence of Security Identity and Key Players' Policy Initiatives.” Politics & Policy 53(5): e70074. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.70074.

Kilinç-Pala, Pinar Buket. 2021. “Approaches in Energy Exclusive Security: Theories of Energy Security and the Dominance of Realism.” Politics and Policy 49(3): 771–94. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12411.

Kong, Linggong. 2025. “A Study on the Formulation of the Biden Administration's Semiconductor Policy Toward China Through the Lens of the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF).” Politics & Policy 53(6): e70106. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.70106.

This study applies the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) to a policy of regional devolution of powers. The analysis focuses on differentiated autonomy in Italy, examining the narratives that emerged in the legislative process of the law regulating the procedures for its activation. The context is of particular interest due to the combination of a polarized political system, such as the Italian one, and a policy providing for a new distribution of powers involving actors from different levels of government. The analysis compares the narratives of the two coalitions supporting and opposing the policy, through the statements of the political national and regional leaders. The findings shed light on the relationship between policy and politics, suggesting that the coalitions tended to: oversimplify the complexity of the policy; make policy narratives as political as possible in the presence of uncertain results; and mirror each other's narratives to ensure the support of their respective audiences.

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Chang, Katherine T., and Elizabeth A. Koebele. 2020. “What Drives Coalitions' Narrative Strategy? Exploring Policy Narratives around School Choice.” Politics & Policy 48(4): 618–57. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12367.

Boscarino, Jessica E. 2022. “Is Seeing Believing? Comparing the Influence of Textual and Visual Policy Narratives on Public Opinion.” Politics & Policy 50(4): 720-751. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12471.

Shanahan, Elizabeth A., Mark K. McBeth, and Paul L. Hathaway. 2011. “Narrative Policy Framework: The Influence of Media Policy Narrative on Public Opinion.” Politics & Policy 39(3): 373–400. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2011.00295.x.

Conventional wisdom holds that corruption undermines political trust, yet causal evidence remains limited, particularly in authoritarian contexts. This study addresses this gap by implementing a nationwide survey experiment in China to examine how exposure to corruption information affects political trust across multiple levels of government. Respondents were randomly assigned to receive scenarios involving corruption by officials at different administrative tiers, with trust measured both before and after treatment. The results show that exposure to corruption significantly reduces political trust, demonstrating a strong negative effect on perceived government legitimacy. Moreover, the findings reveal a spillover effect: corruption at higher levels of government not only decreases trust in the implicated level but also erodes trust in lower tiers. By establishing causal links between corruption cues and political trust across hierarchical institutions, this research advances the understanding of trust dynamics in authoritarian contexts and underscores the importance of targeted anti-corruption efforts within multi-level governance systems.

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Kostadinova, Tatiana, & Milena I. Neshkova. 2025. “Personalist Leadership and Corruption: Evidence from Third Wave Democracies.” Politics & Policy 53(4): e70056. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.70056.

Caillier, James. 2010. “Citizen Trust, Political Corruption, and Voting Behavior: Connecting the Dots.” Politics & Policy 38(5): 1015–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2010.00267.

Malmberg, Fredrik G., and Henrik Serup Christensen. 2021. “Voting Women, Protesting Men: A Multilevel Analysis of Corruption, Gender, and Political Participation.” Politics & Policy 49(1): 126–61. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12393.

We theorize the notion of “fear of domination” and argue that people rely on a series of realist heuristics to gauge their support for an IO. Based on realist thinking, we hypothesize that individuals are less likely to support IOs that are subject to domination or manipulation. We identify five different aspects that describe whether an IO could fall prey to the dominance of a single actor. We fielded a conjoint survey experiment through Amazon Mechanical Turk in December 2020. The analysis supports the theory of fear of domination, and it shows that Americans are far less likely to support IOs that are mainly funded by China in comparison to those funded mainly by the EU or equally by all member states. Americans also prefer IOs where decisions are made via majoritarian rule, IOs that are focused on specific issue areas, and IOs where the US has made financial contributions.

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Scheetz, Emma, & David Carter. 2026. “Channeling Action: How Civic Recreation Organizations Shape Civic Capacity and Engagement.” Politics & Policy 54 (4): e70161. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.70161.

Nisley, Thomas Jay. 2025. “The Peace Corps and the Popular Perception of the United States in Africa.” Politics & Policy 53 (6): 370101. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.70101.

Hoffmann, Marta. 2024. “The Power of WHO Epistemic Communities: The “Tobacco Epidemic” as Construct.” Politics & Policy 52 (3): 520–550. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12602.

To what extent does regime type condition the association between social capital and subjective well-being (SWB)? While social capital is widely recognized as a correlate of SWB, little is known about how this association varies across political contexts. Using data from the World Values Survey and Our World in Data, we analyze 262,945 observations from 95 countries to examine how three dimensions of social capital—in-group trust, out-group trust, and informal social networks—are associated with life satisfaction, happiness, and financial satisfaction. In-group trust and informal social networks are positively associated with all three SWB dimensions across political regimes. More importantly, the results reveal that regime type consistently moderates the association between out-group trust and all three SWB outcomes, with the relationship between out-group trust and well-being being more favorable in democratic contexts. By contrast, the associations of in-group trust and informal social networks with well-being are largely regime-invariant, suggesting that the well-being benefits of close social ties operate independently of political regime type. These findings highlight the nuanced role of political context in shaping the social capital–SWB relationship, with regime type mattering most for how out-group trust translates into well-being.

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Flavin, P., A. C. Pacek, and B. Radcliff. 2011. “State Intervention and Subjective Well-Being in Advanced Industrial Democracies.” Politics & Policy 39, no. 2: 251–269. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2011.00290.x.

Ramírez Herrera, M. 2019. “The Measurement of Well-Being Caught between Tradition and Modernity in Mexico's Poverty Reduction Strategy.” Politics & Policy 47, no. 1: 79–104. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12283.

Jakubow, A. 2014. “State Intervention and Life Satisfaction Reconsidered: The Role of Governance Quality and Resource Misallocation.” Politics & Policy 42, no. 1: 3–36. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12057.