Extant, literature shows that it is important for leaders to create clarity and transparency to foster trust with their followers but also that it is important for leaders to construct slightly different meanings for each audience they face, to ensure buy-in for strategy implementation. This paper illuminates how these two contradictory dimensions of leadership coexist within a senior team in a financial institution, during the implementation of strategic change. A two years study of a multilevel team, formed by top, senior- and lower-level managers, uncovers the dynamics through which meanings are constructed through upward and downward sensemaking and sensegiving. Different leadership dynamics emerge, formal and skip level. Skip level leadership dynamics are characterized by junior managers and top manager enter in direct leadership relationships, bypassing the senior manager, in search for greater transparency. In doing so they disrupt the formal leadership relationship with the senior managers, affecting their leadership identity through sensebreaking. The temporality of this study allows to unveil that skip level leadership can be unsustainable, and tend to revert to formal leadership, favoring the existence of pragmatic ambiguity, where meaning construction is controlled by the senior managers mediation. Controlled attempts to create direct communication between top and junior managers are created, but only provide an illusion of transparency.
{"title":"Seeking Transparency Whilst Embracing Ambiguity: Skip Level Leadership Dynamics during Strategic Change","authors":"Z. Jaser","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3741472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3741472","url":null,"abstract":"Extant, literature shows that it is important for leaders to create clarity and transparency to foster trust with their followers but also that it is important for leaders to construct slightly different meanings for each audience they face, to ensure buy-in for strategy implementation. This paper illuminates how these two contradictory dimensions of leadership coexist within a senior team in a financial institution, during the implementation of strategic change. A two years study of a multilevel team, formed by top, senior- and lower-level managers, uncovers the dynamics through which meanings are constructed through upward and downward sensemaking and sensegiving. Different leadership dynamics emerge, formal and skip level. Skip level leadership dynamics are characterized by junior managers and top manager enter in direct leadership relationships, bypassing the senior manager, in search for greater transparency. In doing so they disrupt the formal leadership relationship with the senior managers, affecting their leadership identity through sensebreaking. The temporality of this study allows to unveil that skip level leadership can be unsustainable, and tend to revert to formal leadership, favoring the existence of pragmatic ambiguity, where meaning construction is controlled by the senior managers mediation. Controlled attempts to create direct communication between top and junior managers are created, but only provide an illusion of transparency.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"303 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122240184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jeffrey Carpenter, Andrea Robbett, Prottoy A. Akbar
Despite the "1/N problem" associated with profit sharing, the empirical literature finds that sharing profits with workers has a positive impact on work team and firm performance. We examine one possible resolution to this puzzle by observing that, although the incentive to work harder under profit sharing is weak, it might be sufficient to motivate workers to report each other for shirking, especially if the workers are reciprocally-minded. Our model provides the rationale for this conjecture and we discuss the results of an experiment that confirms that profit sharing is most effective when peer reporting is possible.
{"title":"Profit Sharing and Peer Reporting","authors":"Jeffrey Carpenter, Andrea Robbett, Prottoy A. Akbar","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2017.2831","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2831","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the \"1/N problem\" associated with profit sharing, the empirical literature finds that sharing profits with workers has a positive impact on work team and firm performance. We examine one possible resolution to this puzzle by observing that, although the incentive to work harder under profit sharing is weak, it might be sufficient to motivate workers to report each other for shirking, especially if the workers are reciprocally-minded. Our model provides the rationale for this conjecture and we discuss the results of an experiment that confirms that profit sharing is most effective when peer reporting is possible.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"128 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124541607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the optimal compensation scheme, job design, and severance policy for a team using a model of repeated moral hazard. In the optimal contract, the agent may be paid to quit after a poor performance. We show that a generous severance policy facilitates the adoption of team incentives and team-based production by making it cost-effective to implement peer monitoring and sanction among the agents.
{"title":"Pay to Quit and Team Incentives","authors":"Pak Hung Au","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2863123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2863123","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper examines the optimal compensation scheme, job design, and severance policy for a team using a model of repeated moral hazard. In the optimal contract, the agent may be paid to quit after a poor performance. We show that a generous severance policy facilitates the adoption of team incentives and team-based production by making it cost-effective to implement peer monitoring and sanction among the agents.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"47 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115936942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-07-03DOI: 10.22740/KDI.FORUM.E.2017.265
Yongseong Kim
The English version of this paper can be found at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2996315. Korean Abstract: □ 본고에서는 미래 직업세계의 핵심적 역량인 ‘문제해결 스킬(problem-solving skills)’의 활용 정도와 관련된 문제점과 그 원인을 살펴본 후, 개선을 위한 정책방향을 모색하고자 함. □ 국제비교를 통해 볼 때, 우리나라 근로자(16~65세)의 스킬 활용도는 대체로 양호한 편이나, 업무 관련 문제에 다양한 스킬을 사용하여 해결을 모색하는 문제해결 스킬의 활용은 상당히 부진 - 문제해결 스킬은 미래 일자리의 핵심적 역량이므로 이를 적극적으로 계발하고 활발히 사용토록 하는 것은 매우 중요 - 교육 · 훈련 기회의 부족, 직장 및 업무에서의 소통과 협력 부재, 노동시장 이중구조는 문제해결 스킬의 활용을 어렵게 하는 원인이 되고 있을 가능성 □ 문제해결 스킬이 직장에서 충분히 활용되기 위해서는 교육 및 훈련의 내용과 방식의 변화, 스킬 친화적 노동시장구조의 개선 등 다방면의 노력이 필요 - ‘일 기반 학습’과 같이 교육 · 훈련에서 현장성을 강화하고, 훈련의 내용은 전문적 지식과 함께 타인과 의 협력 및 타협, 의사소통 등 연성기술(soft skills)을 포함하여 구성 - 일자리의 안정성이 훼손될 우려가 있는 채용 및 해고 위주의 ‘인력조정의 유연성’보다 임금 및 근로시간 조정 등 ‘근로조건의 유연화’를 통해 일자리의 안정성을 높임으로써 기업과 근로자가 일자리에서 필요한 스킬을 축적하고 활발하게 사용할 수 있는 여건을 조성 English Abstract: This study attempts to explore the use of and underlying issues related to problem-solving skills, a vital competency in future jobs, and policy measures for improvement. An international comparison shows that Korean workers (aged 16-65) are fairly good at utilizing their skills but poor at applying those skills to solve problems at work. As problem solving is a key future competency, it is essential that the relevant skills are enhanced and actively utilized. However, insufficient education and training opportunities, poor communication and cooperation at work and a dual labor market structure could become obstacles. To enhance the use of problem-solving skills at work, concerted efforts at various levels are needed, for example changing the contents and methods of educational/training programs and establishing a skill-friendly labor market structure. Educational/training programs need to provide more field experiences and professional knowledge as well as soft skills including collaboration, compromise and communication Instead of a ‘flexible adjustment of the workforce’ through easy hiring and firing, labor reforms should be implemented though a ‘flexible adjustment of working conditions’ (i.e. wages and working hours) so that both employer and employee can accumulate and fully utilize the necessary skills in problem solving in a stable employment relationship.
The English version of this paper can be found at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2996315。Korean Abstract:□在本高考察了未来职业世界的核心力量“解决问题的技能(problem-solving skills)”的运用程度和相关问题及原因后，将探索改善的政策方向。□通过国际比较来看,我国劳动者(16 ~ 65岁)的技能的使用率大体良好,或多种技能,业务相关问题解决的前提下,以谋求解决问题技能的运用相当不振-解决问题技能是未来工作岗位的核心力量,积极启发,活跃的使用是很重要的——教育、训练机会不足,车间及工作中的沟通和合作缺乏,劳动市场结构,是解决问题技能更容易利用的原因可能正在□解决问题技能在这个单位是,为了充分利用教育和训练的内容和方式的变化、亲和技能劳动市场结构的改善等需要多方面的努力——“日基础学习”:加强教育、训练中,现场性,训练内容包括专业知识、与他人合作与妥协、沟通等软技术组成,包括软实力(soft skills)在内——工作岗位的稳定性有可能损坏为主的聘用和解雇“人力调整的灵活性”比工资及工作时间调整等通过《劳动条件的灵活性就业的稳定性,提高企业和劳动者在工作岗位所需的技能积累活泼地可以使用的english营造abstract:This study attempts to explore the use of and underlying issues related to problem-solving skills, a vital competency in future jobs, and policy measures for improvement。An international comparison shows that Korean workers (aged 16-65) are fairly good at utilizing their skills but poor at applying those skills to solve problems at work。As problem solving is a key future competency, it is essential that the relevant skills are enhanced and actively utilized。However, insufficient education and training opportunities, poor communication and cooperation at work and a dual labor market structure could become obstacles。To enhance the use of problem-solving skills at work, concerted efforts at various levels are needed，for example changing the contents and methods of educational/training programs and establishing a skill-friendly labor market structure。Educational/training programs need to provide more field experiences and professional knowledge as well as soft skills including colboration;compromise and communication Instead of a ' flexible adjustment of the workforce ' through easy hiring and firing;labor reforms should be implemented though a ' flexible adjustment of working conditions ' (i.e. wages and working hours) so that both employer and employee can accumulate and fully utilize thenecessary skills in problem solving in a stable employment relationship。
{"title":"한국 성인역량의 현황과 개선방향: 문제해결 스킬을 중심으로 (Enhancing Korea's Work Competency: Focusing on Problem-Solving Skills)","authors":"Yongseong Kim","doi":"10.22740/KDI.FORUM.E.2017.265","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22740/KDI.FORUM.E.2017.265","url":null,"abstract":"The English version of this paper can be found at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2996315. \u0000Korean Abstract: □ 본고에서는 미래 직업세계의 핵심적 역량인 ‘문제해결 스킬(problem-solving skills)’의 활용 정도와 관련된 문제점과 그 원인을 살펴본 후, 개선을 위한 정책방향을 모색하고자 함. \u0000□ 국제비교를 통해 볼 때, 우리나라 근로자(16~65세)의 스킬 활용도는 대체로 양호한 편이나, 업무 관련 문제에 다양한 스킬을 사용하여 해결을 모색하는 문제해결 스킬의 활용은 상당히 부진 \u0000- 문제해결 스킬은 미래 일자리의 핵심적 역량이므로 이를 적극적으로 계발하고 활발히 사용토록 하는 것은 매우 중요 \u0000- 교육 · 훈련 기회의 부족, 직장 및 업무에서의 소통과 협력 부재, 노동시장 이중구조는 문제해결 스킬의 활용을 어렵게 하는 원인이 되고 있을 가능성 \u0000□ 문제해결 스킬이 직장에서 충분히 활용되기 위해서는 교육 및 훈련의 내용과 방식의 변화, 스킬 친화적 노동시장구조의 개선 등 다방면의 노력이 필요 \u0000- ‘일 기반 학습’과 같이 교육 · 훈련에서 현장성을 강화하고, 훈련의 내용은 전문적 지식과 함께 타인과 의 협력 및 타협, 의사소통 등 연성기술(soft skills)을 포함하여 구성 \u0000- 일자리의 안정성이 훼손될 우려가 있는 채용 및 해고 위주의 ‘인력조정의 유연성’보다 임금 및 근로시간 조정 등 ‘근로조건의 유연화’를 통해 일자리의 안정성을 높임으로써 기업과 근로자가 일자리에서 필요한 스킬을 축적하고 활발하게 사용할 수 있는 여건을 조성 \u0000English Abstract: This study attempts to explore the use of and underlying issues related to problem-solving skills, a vital competency in future jobs, and policy measures for improvement. \u0000An international comparison shows that Korean workers (aged 16-65) are fairly good at utilizing their skills but poor at applying those skills to solve problems at work. \u0000As problem solving is a key future competency, it is essential that the relevant skills are enhanced and actively utilized. \u0000However, insufficient education and training opportunities, poor communication and cooperation at work and a dual labor market structure could become obstacles. \u0000To enhance the use of problem-solving skills at work, concerted efforts at various levels are needed, for example changing the contents and methods of educational/training programs and establishing a skill-friendly labor market structure. \u0000Educational/training programs need to provide more field experiences and professional knowledge as well as soft skills including collaboration, compromise and communication \u0000Instead of a ‘flexible adjustment of the workforce’ through easy hiring and firing, labor reforms should be implemented though a ‘flexible adjustment of working conditions’ (i.e. wages and working hours) so that both employer and employee can accumulate and fully utilize the necessary skills in problem solving in a stable employment relationship.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129792025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This is a review of research papers on Banking Industry in India. The government policy of less restriction in governmental regulations, liberalization, globalization and privatization have all contributed majorly towards Public Sector Banks in India to forcefully compete with Private and Foreign Banks. Organizational effectiveness can be achieved by Training and skill development of employees at various levels. Implementing Training and skill development programs in banks helps in running banking business effectively, and makes the banks prepared to cope up with changes and developments. Retention of employees with due compensation and reward system leads to commitment at work place, job satisfaction and motivation of employees. Further the banks implementation of Training and skill development for employee growth, their empowerment and environment of trust gives a competitive advantage due to the implementation of best HR Practices.
{"title":"Employee Retention, Training and Development in Banking Sector: A Review Paper","authors":"A. Dikshit, T. Jain","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2970490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2970490","url":null,"abstract":"This is a review of research papers on Banking Industry in India. The government policy of less restriction in governmental regulations, liberalization, globalization and privatization have all contributed majorly towards Public Sector Banks in India to forcefully compete with Private and Foreign Banks. Organizational effectiveness can be achieved by Training and skill development of employees at various levels. Implementing Training and skill development programs in banks helps in running banking business effectively, and makes the banks prepared to cope up with changes and developments. Retention of employees with due compensation and reward system leads to commitment at work place, job satisfaction and motivation of employees. Further the banks implementation of Training and skill development for employee growth, their empowerment and environment of trust gives a competitive advantage due to the implementation of best HR Practices.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134306509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We extend an on-the-job search framework in order to allow firms to hire workers with different skills and skills to interact with firms? total factor productivity (TFP). Our model implies that more productive firms are larger, pay higher wages, and hire more workers at all skill levels and proportionately more at higher skill types, matching key stylized facts. We calibrate the model using five educational attainment levels as proxies for skills and estimate nonparametrically firm-skill output from the wage distributions for different educational levels. We consider two periods in time (1985 and 2009) and three counterfactual economies in which we evaluate how the wage distribution would have evolved if we kept one of the following key characteristics at its 1985?s levels: firm-skill output distribution, labor market frictions, and skill distribution. Our results indicate that 79.2 percent of the overall wage dispersion and 72.6 percent of the within-group component can be attributed to a shift in the firm-skill output distribution. Once we assume a parametric calibration of the output per skill-TFP pair, we are able to show that most of the effect of changes in the output distribution is due to an increase in the average labor productivity of college graduates and post-graduates.
{"title":"Firms, Skills, and Wage Inequality","authors":"Roberto B. Pinheiro, Murat Tasci","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2973972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2973972","url":null,"abstract":"We extend an on-the-job search framework in order to allow firms to hire workers with different skills and skills to interact with firms? total factor productivity (TFP). Our model implies that more productive firms are larger, pay higher wages, and hire more workers at all skill levels and proportionately more at higher skill types, matching key stylized facts. We calibrate the model using five educational attainment levels as proxies for skills and estimate nonparametrically firm-skill output from the wage distributions for different educational levels. We consider two periods in time (1985 and 2009) and three counterfactual economies in which we evaluate how the wage distribution would have evolved if we kept one of the following key characteristics at its 1985?s levels: firm-skill output distribution, labor market frictions, and skill distribution. Our results indicate that 79.2 percent of the overall wage dispersion and 72.6 percent of the within-group component can be attributed to a shift in the firm-skill output distribution. Once we assume a parametric calibration of the output per skill-TFP pair, we are able to show that most of the effect of changes in the output distribution is due to an increase in the average labor productivity of college graduates and post-graduates.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128156345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Purpose: The object of this research is to investigate work motivating factors in the public sector in Greece, as well as to study demographic attributes, placing emphasis on age and gender as determinants of employee motives. Design/methodology/approach: To answer our research questions, a questionnaire was distributed at the beginning of 2015 to a public - sector organization in central Greece. A total of 318 anonymous survey responses were collected and analysed with SPSS. Findings: In the public organization under survey, the leading employee motives are an increase in salaries, opportunities for hierarchical advancement in the organization, as well as the development of personal skills. Moreover, motivational differences are noted among Baby Boomers, Generation X and Generation Y. Research limitations/implications: As the present study has been conducted on a single public organization, awareness should be raised as far as the generalizability of the results providing useful insights for further exploration. Originality/value: Limited research has been conducted in the Greek public sector comparing motives among generations.
{"title":"Motivating Public Sector Employees: Evidence from Greece","authors":"K. Koronios, M. Mavromati, T. Kriemadis","doi":"10.25103/IJBESAR.101.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25103/IJBESAR.101.01","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose: The object of this research is to investigate work motivating factors in the public sector in Greece, as well as to study demographic attributes, placing emphasis on age and gender as determinants of employee motives. Design/methodology/approach: To answer our research questions, a questionnaire was distributed at the beginning of 2015 to a public - sector organization in central Greece. A total of 318 anonymous survey responses were collected and analysed with SPSS. Findings: In the public organization under survey, the leading employee motives are an increase in salaries, opportunities for hierarchical advancement in the organization, as well as the development of personal skills. Moreover, motivational differences are noted among Baby Boomers, Generation X and Generation Y. Research limitations/implications: As the present study has been conducted on a single public organization, awareness should be raised as far as the generalizability of the results providing useful insights for further exploration. Originality/value: Limited research has been conducted in the Greek public sector comparing motives among generations.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"1999 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127323033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Patricio S. Dalton, Victor H. Gonzalez, C. Noussair
Abstract: To boost employees’ performance, firms often offer monetary bonuses when production goals are reached. However, the evidence suggests that the particular level of a goal is critical to the effectiveness of this practice. Goals must be challenging yet achievable. Computing optimal goals when employees have private information about their own abilities is often not feasible for the firm. To solve this problem, we propose a compensation scheme in which workers set their own production goals. We provide a simple model of self-chosen goals and test its predictions in the laboratory. The evidence we find in the laboratory confirms our model’s predictions for men, but not for women. Men exert greater effort under the self-chosen goal contract system than under a piece rate contract. In contrast, women perform worse under the self-chosen goal contract. Further analysis suggests that this is because women fail to set goals that are challenging enough, because they are less likely to update their goals to take into account their improving performance as they repeat the task.
{"title":"Self-Chosen Goals: Incentives and Gender Differences","authors":"Patricio S. Dalton, Victor H. Gonzalez, C. Noussair","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2583872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2583872","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: To boost employees’ performance, firms often offer monetary bonuses when production goals are reached. However, the evidence suggests that the particular level of a goal is critical to the effectiveness of this practice. Goals must be challenging yet achievable. Computing optimal goals when employees have private information about their own abilities is often not feasible for the firm. To solve this problem, we propose a compensation scheme in which workers set their own production goals. We provide a simple model of self-chosen goals and test its predictions in the laboratory. The evidence we find in the laboratory confirms our model’s predictions for men, but not for women. Men exert greater effort under the self-chosen goal contract system than under a piece rate contract. In contrast, women perform worse under the self-chosen goal contract. Further analysis suggests that this is because women fail to set goals that are challenging enough, because they are less likely to update their goals to take into account their improving performance as they repeat the task.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131643118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a two-task team project with observable task outcomes, optimal incentives prioritize tasks differently depending on task externalities. When the tasks are independent, Principal follows a decreasing order by placing more essential task first. A task is more essential if its failure compromises the overall project's chance of success from a task-specific cutoff level by a greater percentage. This definition has no systematic relations to the variance of task outcomes. In particular, a more risky task can be less essential or more essential. Under externalities, essentiality and impact jointly determine the optimal ordering. A task with much higher impact can be performed early even if it is less essential. Optimal task ordering thus raises subtle new issues and forms an integral part in team incentives. Our analysis provides some contrast with recent team incentives results.
{"title":"Task Ordering in Incentives Under Externalities","authors":"M. Agastya, P. Bag, Nona Pepito","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2749529","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2749529","url":null,"abstract":"In a two-task team project with observable task outcomes, optimal incentives prioritize tasks differently depending on task externalities. When the tasks are independent, Principal follows a decreasing order by placing more essential task first. A task is more essential if its failure compromises the overall project's chance of success from a task-specific cutoff level by a greater percentage. This definition has no systematic relations to the variance of task outcomes. In particular, a more risky task can be less essential or more essential. Under externalities, essentiality and impact jointly determine the optimal ordering. A task with much higher impact can be performed early even if it is less essential. Optimal task ordering thus raises subtle new issues and forms an integral part in team incentives. Our analysis provides some contrast with recent team incentives results.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"155 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115430532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I investigate the impact of innovative work practices and of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) on employees' motivations. While the existing literature assumes that their positive effects on performance are due to employees' motivation but only assess related concepts, this paper directly analyses employees' motivations. The data come from a cross-sectional survey conducted in 2013. The paper provides new and interesting results on how firms can build a motivational environment shaped by work practices and ICT. I resort to an original empirical framework that permits one to take into account the potential reverse causation between, on the one hand, the voluntary participation in innovative work practices and the use of ICT and motivations on the other. Within this framework, I modify what previous analyses reveal about quality circle and training participation. The results confirm the positive role of work practices such as teamwork, quality norms, formal appraisals, management recognition and family-friendly policies on employee's positive attitudes. Moreover, I introduce a large range of ICT compared to existing research and find that the ICT that most contributed to the development of a motivational environment are those that facilitate access to information and knowledge such as workflow, Internet and e-mail.
{"title":"Innovative Work Practices, ICT Use and Employees' Motivations","authors":"Ludivine Martin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2695799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2695799","url":null,"abstract":"I investigate the impact of innovative work practices and of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) on employees' motivations. While the existing literature assumes that their positive effects on performance are due to employees' motivation but only assess related concepts, this paper directly analyses employees' motivations. The data come from a cross-sectional survey conducted in 2013. The paper provides new and interesting results on how firms can build a motivational environment shaped by work practices and ICT. I resort to an original empirical framework that permits one to take into account the potential reverse causation between, on the one hand, the voluntary participation in innovative work practices and the use of ICT and motivations on the other. Within this framework, I modify what previous analyses reveal about quality circle and training participation. The results confirm the positive role of work practices such as teamwork, quality norms, formal appraisals, management recognition and family-friendly policies on employee's positive attitudes. Moreover, I introduce a large range of ICT compared to existing research and find that the ICT that most contributed to the development of a motivational environment are those that facilitate access to information and knowledge such as workflow, Internet and e-mail.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132000065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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