While often overlooked, middle managers play an important role for organizations. Whether through communication linkages or simply by greasing the wheel of productivity, organizations with properly motivated middle managers typically have a stronger core culture and more profitable outcomes. This study seeks to identify key motivational factors for middle managers as well as the disconnect that many organizations have in properly utilizing middle management. In particular, we examine the problems stemming from the Pygmalion Effect and hypereffectivity. Our conclusions are supported with survey data and topline BLS demographic data. Using regression analysis, we show that what middle managers say motivates themselves is not always what executives believe motivates middle managers. Implications for leadership development and directions for future research are also provided.
{"title":"An Eye on the Middle: Motivation and Support for Middle Managers","authors":"Alan T Belasen, Ariel R Belasen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2941129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2941129","url":null,"abstract":"While often overlooked, middle managers play an important role for organizations. Whether through communication linkages or simply by greasing the wheel of productivity, organizations with properly motivated middle managers typically have a stronger core culture and more profitable outcomes. This study seeks to identify key motivational factors for middle managers as well as the disconnect that many organizations have in properly utilizing middle management. In particular, we examine the problems stemming from the Pygmalion Effect and hypereffectivity. Our conclusions are supported with survey data and topline BLS demographic data. Using regression analysis, we show that what middle managers say motivates themselves is not always what executives believe motivates middle managers. Implications for leadership development and directions for future research are also provided.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129652175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper reports the findings of an archival and field study that explores the details of the design and functioning of a complex performance evaluation and incentive system, one that bases incentive payouts on both organizational and individual performance ratings. The archival data include the annual performance ratings of over 700 high- and mid-level managers and professionals over a two-year period. We find a small correlation between the organizational and individual performance ratings, which suggests no performance evaluation halo effect. There is a tendency toward leniency in both rating elements, but the leniency is greater in the organizational portion of the plan because the individual rating is constrained by a prescribed SBU-level maximum. Because the key financial performance measure is EVA, there is no reluctance to setting performance targets below zero. There is some evidence of biases related to employee roles and ranks. And the field study portion of our study revealed great within-company variation in practice and some of the reasons for it.
{"title":"The Anatomy of a Complex Performance-Dependent Incentive System","authors":"K. Merchant, C. Stringer, Paul Shantapriyan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2545149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2545149","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reports the findings of an archival and field study that explores the details of the design and functioning of a complex performance evaluation and incentive system, one that bases incentive payouts on both organizational and individual performance ratings. The archival data include the annual performance ratings of over 700 high- and mid-level managers and professionals over a two-year period. We find a small correlation between the organizational and individual performance ratings, which suggests no performance evaluation halo effect. There is a tendency toward leniency in both rating elements, but the leniency is greater in the organizational portion of the plan because the individual rating is constrained by a prescribed SBU-level maximum. Because the key financial performance measure is EVA, there is no reluctance to setting performance targets below zero. There is some evidence of biases related to employee roles and ranks. And the field study portion of our study revealed great within-company variation in practice and some of the reasons for it.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121318789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Serbian Abstract: Захтеви и очекивања запослених у односу на посао који обављају, могућности напредовања, начини контоле њиховог рада, као и награђивање, постају све израженији и виши. Очекивања високообразоване радне снаге стално се повећавају, па је привлачење и задржавање таквих радника задатак сваке организације, а њихово задовољство радним местом и послом који обављају је веома важан фактор успеха модерних компанија. У исто време, очекује се да се успех организације мења заједно са задовољством запослених. English Abstract: Employee satisfaction related to their job, possibilities of career development, mechanisms of performance measurement and reward, as remuneration systems are of growing importance. Expectations of highly educated workforce continuously increase, so recruiting and retention of such workers becomes key factor of success for modern companies. Success of companies is expected to change together with employee saticfaction.
塞尔维亚文摘: Zahtevi and ochekivavaњa zaslennyh u odnosu na posao ko obavљju，mogluћnosti nadredovaњa，nachini kontole њihovogo rada，kao i rewardsђivavaњe，postajuu fresh izrazheniji i vishi。高水平的教育已成为现代企业成功的重要因素。在此背景下，"组织的成功 "显然是企业员工成功的关键因素。英文摘要：员工对其工作的满意度、职业发展的可能性、绩效衡量和奖励机制以及薪酬制度越来越重要。人们对高学历劳动力的期望不断提高，因此招聘和留住这类员工成为现代企业成功的关键因素。随着员工满意度的提高，公司的成功也会随之改变。
{"title":"Перформансе Организације и Задовољство Запослених (Organization Performance and Employee Satisfaction)","authors":"Milica Jaksic","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2468629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2468629","url":null,"abstract":"Serbian Abstract: Захтеви и очекивања запослених у односу на посао који обављају, могућности напредовања, начини контоле њиховог рада, као и награђивање, постају све израженији и виши. Очекивања високообразоване радне снаге стално се повећавају, па је привлачење и задржавање таквих радника задатак сваке организације, а њихово задовољство радним местом и послом који обављају је веома важан фактор успеха модерних компанија. У исто време, очекује се да се успех организације мења заједно са задовољством запослених. English Abstract: Employee satisfaction related to their job, possibilities of career development, mechanisms of performance measurement and reward, as remuneration systems are of growing importance. Expectations of highly educated workforce continuously increase, so recruiting and retention of such workers becomes key factor of success for modern companies. Success of companies is expected to change together with employee saticfaction.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131197621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In order to continue its mission in preparing educated work force needed for supporting implementation of Estonian economic policy, universities need to improve the usage of its scarce resources. We study the expectation and attitudes of academic staff towards performance appraisal and related reward systems. Our survey and focus-group interviews revealed that although the systems deployed in those two Universities were different by its nature – Tartu had adopted performance based approach, where performance appraisal results were closely connected to salary, and Tallinn University of Technology had taken position-based approach, where general salary condition on the time of appointment play pivotal role – the expectations of staff were similar. In both universities, leaders preferred more measurable performance-based systems, but the rest of staff favoured more loose and stable approaches. Implications of results towards appraisal and rewards systems for academic staff are discussed.
{"title":"Performance Management of Academic Staff on the Example of the Faculties of Economics in University of Tartu and in Tallinn University of Technology","authors":"K. Turk, Elar Killumets","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2489091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2489091","url":null,"abstract":"In order to continue its mission in preparing educated work force needed for supporting implementation of Estonian economic policy, universities need to improve the usage of its scarce resources. We study the expectation and attitudes of academic staff towards performance appraisal and related reward systems. Our survey and focus-group interviews revealed that although the systems deployed in those two Universities were different by its nature – Tartu had adopted performance based approach, where performance appraisal results were closely connected to salary, and Tallinn University of Technology had taken position-based approach, where general salary condition on the time of appointment play pivotal role – the expectations of staff were similar. In both universities, leaders preferred more measurable performance-based systems, but the rest of staff favoured more loose and stable approaches. Implications of results towards appraisal and rewards systems for academic staff are discussed.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123033174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper assesses whether the formation of grassroots unions under the Professional Union Leader and Organizer Program’ (PULOP) in China provide one viable pathway through which renewal might occur. Data obtained from in-depth interviews with union leaders, rank-and-file members, and data from documentary sources are deployed. The findings highlight that, although contingent and precarious, features of ‘managerialist renewal’ occurred within some of PULOP unions. However, these efforts were finally directed towards reconnecting the ruptured two-way transmission belt role of the ACFTU at grassroots private sector workplaces. Nonetheless, since little rank-and-file participation was involved in union organizing and operations, workers at grassroots workplaces were in fact remain distant to their unions. The paper concludes by drawing out the implications of the finding that the two-way transmission belt role of the ACFTU, paradoxically, is remain shattered without genuine worker participation in union formation and operation processes.
{"title":"Union Renewal or Transmission Belt? - An Examination of the ‘Professional Union Leader and Organizer Program’ in China","authors":"Youqing Fan, P. Gahan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2209721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2209721","url":null,"abstract":"This paper assesses whether the formation of grassroots unions under the Professional Union Leader and Organizer Program’ (PULOP) in China provide one viable pathway through which renewal might occur. Data obtained from in-depth interviews with union leaders, rank-and-file members, and data from documentary sources are deployed. The findings highlight that, although contingent and precarious, features of ‘managerialist renewal’ occurred within some of PULOP unions. However, these efforts were finally directed towards reconnecting the ruptured two-way transmission belt role of the ACFTU at grassroots private sector workplaces. Nonetheless, since little rank-and-file participation was involved in union organizing and operations, workers at grassroots workplaces were in fact remain distant to their unions. The paper concludes by drawing out the implications of the finding that the two-way transmission belt role of the ACFTU, paradoxically, is remain shattered without genuine worker participation in union formation and operation processes.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127694527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A first difference econometric method is employed to assess the incentives created by contracts. Data from quarterbacks in the NFL is used to identify whether shirking occurs after significant salary increases. We find that a QB's rating decreases, interceptions become more frequent while touchdowns decrease, and passing yards reduce when salary increases.
{"title":"The Disincentive of Salary Increases: Evidence from NFL Quarterback Performances","authors":"Bryan C. McCannon, K. O'Laughlin, Z. Scott","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2194158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2194158","url":null,"abstract":"A first difference econometric method is employed to assess the incentives created by contracts. Data from quarterbacks in the NFL is used to identify whether shirking occurs after significant salary increases. We find that a QB's rating decreases, interceptions become more frequent while touchdowns decrease, and passing yards reduce when salary increases.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130879028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper uses a series of experiments with commercial bank loan officers to test the effect of performance incentives on risk-assessment and lending decisions. The paper first shows that, while high-powered incentives lead to greater screening effort and more profitable lending, their power is muted by both deferred compensation and the limited liability typically enjoyed by loan officers. Second, the paper presents direct evidence that incentive contracts distort judgment and beliefs, even among trained professionals with many years of experience. Loans evaluated under more permissive incentive schemes are rated significantly less risky than the same loans evaluated under pay-for-performance.
{"title":"Incentivizing Calculated Risk-Taking: Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers","authors":"Shawn Cole, Martin Kanz, Leora F. Klapper","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2101648","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2101648","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses a series of experiments with commercial bank loan officers to test the effect of performance incentives on risk-assessment and lending decisions. The paper first shows that, while high-powered incentives lead to greater screening effort and more profitable lending, their power is muted by both deferred compensation and the limited liability typically enjoyed by loan officers. Second, the paper presents direct evidence that incentive contracts distort judgment and beliefs, even among trained professionals with many years of experience. Loans evaluated under more permissive incentive schemes are rated significantly less risky than the same loans evaluated under pay-for-performance.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127644934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-07-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-005X.2011.00261.x
Bob Carter, A. Danford, D. Howcroft, H. Richardson, Andrew Smith, Philip Taylor
The adaptation of lean techniques in public services is viewed as an innovative managerialist response to government demands for more efficient services amidst large reductions in public spending. This paper explores workers' experiences of the impact of lean on work organisation and control and provides new insights into developments within contemporary back office clerical work.
{"title":"‘All They Lack is a Chain’: Lean and the New Performance Management in the British Civil Service","authors":"Bob Carter, A. Danford, D. Howcroft, H. Richardson, Andrew Smith, Philip Taylor","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-005X.2011.00261.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-005X.2011.00261.x","url":null,"abstract":"The adaptation of lean techniques in public services is viewed as an innovative managerialist response to government demands for more efficient services amidst large reductions in public spending. This paper explores workers' experiences of the impact of lean on work organisation and control and provides new insights into developments within contemporary back office clerical work.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115363890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We propose an incentive pay scheme for educators that links educator compensation to the ranks of their students within appropriately defined comparison sets, and we show that under certain conditions our scheme induces teachers to allocate socially optimal levels of effort to all students. Because this scheme employs only ordinal information, our scheme allows education authorities to employ completely new assessments at each testing date without ever having to equate various assessment forms. This approach removes incentives for teachers to teach to a particular assessment form and eliminates opportunities to influence reward pay by corrupting the equating process or the scales used to report assessment results. Our system links compensation to the outcomes of properly seeded contests rather than cardinal measures of achievement growth. Thus, education authorities can employ our incentive scheme for educators while employing a separate system for measuring growth in student achievement that involves no stakes for educators. This approach does not create direct incentives for educators to take actions that contaminate the measurement of student progress.
{"title":"Pay for Percentile","authors":"Gadi Barlevy, Derek A. Neal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1501204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1501204","url":null,"abstract":"We propose an incentive pay scheme for educators that links educator compensation to the ranks of their students within appropriately defined comparison sets, and we show that under certain conditions our scheme induces teachers to allocate socially optimal levels of effort to all students. Because this scheme employs only ordinal information, our scheme allows education authorities to employ completely new assessments at each testing date without ever having to equate various assessment forms. This approach removes incentives for teachers to teach to a particular assessment form and eliminates opportunities to influence reward pay by corrupting the equating process or the scales used to report assessment results. Our system links compensation to the outcomes of properly seeded contests rather than cardinal measures of achievement growth. Thus, education authorities can employ our incentive scheme for educators while employing a separate system for measuring growth in student achievement that involves no stakes for educators. This approach does not create direct incentives for educators to take actions that contaminate the measurement of student progress.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116174184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1999-05-28DOI: 10.53808/kus.1999.1.1.103-108-mb
N. Islam
This paper examin es the concepts, theories, and techniques of motivation, which are important aspects of managerial and administrative people in business and industry. The performance of any organization depends on the efficiency of individuals, and that could be achieved when they are motivated with their works. Motivation is the inner force or drive of individuals constituted through feelings, experience, realization of job, work, and behavior of management that directs them to accomplish their work assignments. Definitions pertaining to motivation also disclosed that this force is directed to satisfy or fulfil needs, wants, expectations, and desires. This force could be made favorable by making change of needs and wants satisfying factors that are widely known as means of motivation. The motivational means might broadly be of two types financial and non-financial. By adapting the means of motivation, company can create motivational and well-disciplined work environment that are essential for the present complex business world.
{"title":"A Few Aspect of Motivation: An Overview of Concepts, Theories and Techniques","authors":"N. Islam","doi":"10.53808/kus.1999.1.1.103-108-mb","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53808/kus.1999.1.1.103-108-mb","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examin es the concepts, theories, and techniques of motivation, which are important aspects of managerial and administrative people in business and industry. The performance of any organization depends on the efficiency of individuals, and that could be achieved when they are motivated with their works. Motivation is the inner force or drive of individuals constituted through feelings, experience, realization of job, work, and behavior of management that directs them to accomplish their work assignments. Definitions pertaining to motivation also disclosed that this force is directed to satisfy or fulfil needs, wants, expectations, and desires. This force could be made favorable by making change of needs and wants satisfying factors that are widely known as means of motivation. The motivational means might broadly be of two types financial and non-financial. By adapting the means of motivation, company can create motivational and well-disciplined work environment that are essential for the present complex business world.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116496601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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