Pub Date : 2025-08-27DOI: 10.1177/00220027251372059
Dongan Tan, Hoan La
Why do some countries recover swiftly after economic sanctions are lifted, while others face prolonged stagnation? Despite extensive research on the initiation and effectiveness of sanctions, their aftermath remains understudied. This study develops a theoretical framework to explain post-sanctions economic recovery, focusing on three key determinants: domestic institutional quality, international investment, and sanctions characteristics. Using duration analysis on data from 1960 to 2023, we find that government effectiveness accelerates long-term recovery, while foreign direct investment drives short-term rebounds. Sanctions characteristics yield mixed results: sanction costs show no significant effect, while success and duration are associated with slower recovery. These findings contribute to a broader understanding of how states rebuild after economic disruption, highlighting the role of institutional resilience and external economic reintegration. By bridging the gap between sanctions and economic resilience research, this study provides insights for policymakers seeking to mitigate long-term economic costs and design more effective recovery strategies.
{"title":"The Determinants of Post-Sanctions Economic Recovery","authors":"Dongan Tan, Hoan La","doi":"10.1177/00220027251372059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251372059","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some countries recover swiftly after economic sanctions are lifted, while others face prolonged stagnation? Despite extensive research on the initiation and effectiveness of sanctions, their aftermath remains understudied. This study develops a theoretical framework to explain post-sanctions economic recovery, focusing on three key determinants: domestic institutional quality, international investment, and sanctions characteristics. Using duration analysis on data from 1960 to 2023, we find that government effectiveness accelerates long-term recovery, while foreign direct investment drives short-term rebounds. Sanctions characteristics yield mixed results: sanction costs show no significant effect, while success and duration are associated with slower recovery. These findings contribute to a broader understanding of how states rebuild after economic disruption, highlighting the role of institutional resilience and external economic reintegration. By bridging the gap between sanctions and economic resilience research, this study provides insights for policymakers seeking to mitigate long-term economic costs and design more effective recovery strategies.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144905759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-27DOI: 10.1177/00220027251365535
Michael R. Kenwick, Sumin Lee, Burcu Kolcak
Veterans are disproportionately represented among political elites, and the question of whether military experience shapes their behavior is a central puzzle in the study of international relations. Existing theories link military experience with hawkish or dovish foreign policy preferences. Rather than determining their positions on the use of force ex ante, we argue that domain-specific knowledge and their elevated social status will make veterans less likely to change their expressed positions, especially in response to wartime casualties. We test our argument by analyzing Congressional speeches referencing the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, finding strong support for our expectations. Our core insight is that veteran politicians are partisans first and veterans second, and that military experience may say more about how they update, rather than establish, their political positions.
{"title":"Military Experience and Casualty Sensitivity in Elite Discourse: Evidence From the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan","authors":"Michael R. Kenwick, Sumin Lee, Burcu Kolcak","doi":"10.1177/00220027251365535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251365535","url":null,"abstract":"Veterans are disproportionately represented among political elites, and the question of whether military experience shapes their behavior is a central puzzle in the study of international relations. Existing theories link military experience with hawkish or dovish foreign policy preferences. Rather than determining their positions on the use of force ex ante, we argue that domain-specific knowledge and their elevated social status will make veterans less likely to change their expressed positions, especially in response to wartime casualties. We test our argument by analyzing Congressional speeches referencing the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, finding strong support for our expectations. Our core insight is that veteran politicians are partisans first and veterans second, and that military experience may say more about how they update, rather than establish, their political positions.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"82 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144910691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-20DOI: 10.1177/00220027251370091
Marco Alcocer
Violence against law enforcement by criminal organizations is pervasive in Latin America yet largely unexplored. What explains why and where law enforcement is violently attacked, who is targeted, and how they are killed? This article contends that conflicts between criminal organizations incentivize warring organizations to attack law enforcement, particularly local officers, with more brazen violence. Two original datasets on killings of law enforcement in Mexico show that killings are overwhelmingly of local officers and most frequently perpetrated through coordinated attacks, not confrontations, executions, or kidnappings. Using data on cartels, I first document a strong association between criminal conflicts and the killing of law enforcement officers, and find that the association is driven by killings of state and municipal officers rather than federal officers enforcing the government crackdown. I further show that criminal conflicts increase brazen killings and killings of officers while off duty.
{"title":"Criminal Conflicts and the Killing of Law Enforcement Officers in Mexico","authors":"Marco Alcocer","doi":"10.1177/00220027251370091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251370091","url":null,"abstract":"Violence against law enforcement by criminal organizations is pervasive in Latin America yet largely unexplored. What explains why and where law enforcement is violently attacked, who is targeted, and how they are killed? This article contends that conflicts between criminal organizations incentivize warring organizations to attack law enforcement, particularly local officers, with more brazen violence. Two original datasets on killings of law enforcement in Mexico show that killings are overwhelmingly of local officers and most frequently perpetrated through coordinated attacks, not confrontations, executions, or kidnappings. Using data on cartels, I first document a strong association between criminal conflicts and the killing of law enforcement officers, and find that the association is driven by killings of state and municipal officers rather than federal officers enforcing the government crackdown. I further show that criminal conflicts increase brazen killings and killings of officers while off duty.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144898811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-12DOI: 10.1177/00220027251363229
Lauren Sukin, Stephen Herzog, Alexander Lanoszka
Decades of scholarship hold that great powers shore up global confidence during crises with strong demonstrations of resolve. A much smaller literature critiques these assumptions, suggesting that restraint may strengthen confidence. When and why do restraint or resolve reassure, and for whom? In light of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we appraise early U.S. attempts to reassure allies and partners using public opinion surveys in 24 countries on six continents. Our novel data, which cover rarely surveyed publics, illuminates conditions under which restraint or resolve reassure. We introduce theoretical mechanisms that predict individuals’ propensity to be reassured by resolve or restraint: prior beliefs about the use of force and geopolitical positioning. The results challenge dominant scholarly narratives. Respondents worldwide were reassured by restraint. Forgoing direct intervention in the Russo-Ukrainian War strengthened the U.S.-led order, successfully balancing NATO members’ interests with those of U.S. Indo-Pacific and Global South partners.
{"title":"Winning Hearts and Minds? How the United States Reassured During the Russo-Ukrainian War","authors":"Lauren Sukin, Stephen Herzog, Alexander Lanoszka","doi":"10.1177/00220027251363229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251363229","url":null,"abstract":"Decades of scholarship hold that great powers shore up global confidence during crises with strong demonstrations of resolve. A much smaller literature critiques these assumptions, suggesting that restraint may strengthen confidence. When and why do restraint or resolve reassure, and for whom? In light of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we appraise early U.S. attempts to reassure allies and partners using public opinion surveys in 24 countries on six continents. Our novel data, which cover rarely surveyed publics, illuminates conditions under which restraint or resolve reassure. We introduce theoretical mechanisms that predict individuals’ propensity to be reassured by resolve or restraint: prior beliefs about the use of force and geopolitical positioning. The results challenge dominant scholarly narratives. Respondents worldwide were reassured by restraint. Forgoing direct intervention in the Russo-Ukrainian War strengthened the U.S.-led order, successfully balancing NATO members’ interests with those of U.S. Indo-Pacific and Global South partners.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"193 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144898855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-11DOI: 10.1177/00220027251365162
Edward D. Mansfield, Jon C. W. Pevehouse
Nationalism is on the rise throughout the world. Scholars and practitioners have expressed concern about the effects of rising nationalism on international cooperation, arguing that nationalism poses a risk to the liberal international economic order. Other observers maintain that nationalism need not be associated with trade protectionism. Yet there has been little cross-country research on the effects of nationalism on trade cooperation. We argue that nationalism has led to a reluctance to sign trade agreements in democracies, but that its effects on trade policy in autocracies are ambiguous. Nationalism in the public is associated with antipathy toward trade. Since democratically elected governments must be responsive to their constituents or risk losing office, nationalist governments in democratic countries tend to be protectionist. We find a strong negative relationship between nationalism and signing trade agreements in democracies. These findings shed light on the dynamics of trade and globalization in the current era of nationalism.
{"title":"Nationalism, Regime Type, and Trade Agreements","authors":"Edward D. Mansfield, Jon C. W. Pevehouse","doi":"10.1177/00220027251365162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251365162","url":null,"abstract":"Nationalism is on the rise throughout the world. Scholars and practitioners have expressed concern about the effects of rising nationalism on international cooperation, arguing that nationalism poses a risk to the liberal international economic order. Other observers maintain that nationalism need not be associated with trade protectionism. Yet there has been little cross-country research on the effects of nationalism on trade cooperation. We argue that nationalism has led to a reluctance to sign trade agreements in democracies, but that its effects on trade policy in autocracies are ambiguous. Nationalism in the public is associated with antipathy toward trade. Since democratically elected governments must be responsive to their constituents or risk losing office, nationalist governments in democratic countries tend to be protectionist. We find a strong negative relationship between nationalism and signing trade agreements in democracies. These findings shed light on the dynamics of trade and globalization in the current era of nationalism.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144898857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-11DOI: 10.1177/00220027251359720
Kai A. Konrad, Florian Morath
Motivated by the history of military alliances during and after the Cold War, we study the sequential expansion of the hegemonial alliances of two great powers. Geography matters for the allocation of the collateral damage of a future military conflict. Current frontline countries bear a major burden. They would prefer to pass this collateral damage on to new members. This motive can drive expansion, which comes to an end only when all remaining non-affiliated countries have been absorbed by one of the two alliances. Those countries are willing to make concessions as part of the accession negotiations, and the overall value of the concessions can reach multiples of the actual collateral damage of military conflict. As a result, alliance expansion may continue beyond what would be optimal from a security perspective.
{"title":"Alliance Formation in Regional Space: Shifting the Battlefront Between Competing Hegemonial Powers","authors":"Kai A. Konrad, Florian Morath","doi":"10.1177/00220027251359720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251359720","url":null,"abstract":"Motivated by the history of military alliances during and after the Cold War, we study the sequential expansion of the hegemonial alliances of two great powers. Geography matters for the allocation of the collateral damage of a future military conflict. Current frontline countries bear a major burden. They would prefer to pass this collateral damage on to new members. This motive can drive expansion, which comes to an end only when all remaining non-affiliated countries have been absorbed by one of the two alliances. Those countries are willing to make concessions as part of the accession negotiations, and the overall value of the concessions can reach multiples of the actual collateral damage of military conflict. As a result, alliance expansion may continue beyond what would be optimal from a security perspective.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"175 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144898856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-08-01DOI: 10.1177/00220027251362147
M. Patrick Hulme, Erik Gartzke, Alex Braithwaite, Lauren Gilbert
Students of international relations continue to debate the role of power as a cause of conflict. In particular, there exists no consensus about whether power parity or preponderance is more likely to trigger militarized disputes. Generally overlooked in this and related controversies is the question of where power is actually exercised. It is widely accepted that a state’s power declines with distance. This “loss-of-strength gradient” in turn must imply that the relative power of any combination of countries is not a constant, but rather varies spatially at different locations around the globe. Implementing this simple but as yet undocumented insight to the debate over the effects of relative power, we show that “proximate power”—i.e., power adjusted for the loss-of-strength imposed by distance—reveals a close relationship between parity and conflict onset. The finding conforms with the expectations of modern bargaining approaches to war, which emphasize the role uncertainty plays in precipitating military contests.
{"title":"Power, Parity, and Place: Why Forgetting the Loss-of-Strength Gradient Misses the Relative Power Relationship","authors":"M. Patrick Hulme, Erik Gartzke, Alex Braithwaite, Lauren Gilbert","doi":"10.1177/00220027251362147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251362147","url":null,"abstract":"Students of international relations continue to debate the role of power as a cause of conflict. In particular, there exists no consensus about whether power parity or preponderance is more likely to trigger militarized disputes. Generally overlooked in this and related controversies is the question of <jats:italic>where</jats:italic> power is actually exercised. It is widely accepted that a state’s power declines with distance. This “loss-of-strength gradient” in turn must imply that the relative power of any combination of countries is not a constant, but rather varies spatially at different locations around the globe. Implementing this simple but as yet undocumented insight to the debate over the effects of relative power, we show that “proximate power”—i.e., power adjusted for the loss-of-strength imposed by distance—reveals a close relationship between parity and conflict onset. The finding conforms with the expectations of modern bargaining approaches to war, which emphasize the role uncertainty plays in precipitating military contests.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144766173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-29DOI: 10.1177/00220027251362832
Christian Oswald
Conflict forecasting has seen two recent developments: a shift to predicting continuous variables and a debate about the value of structural and procedural variables. This paper contributes to these efforts and proposes the category of salience variables in the form of Google Trends and Wikipedia data. Internet searches can be precursors of conflict intensity as a result of for example an increase in protests, violent behavior, or public announcements. Data are readily and openly available, updated in real time, and provide global coverage which makes it ideal for near-real time forecasting. Prediction targets are the number of security-related incidents and battle-related, non-state, and civilian casualties. I demonstrate the value of salience variables using various out-of-sample windows and performance metrics on the country- and province-month level. I find evidence that salience variables have considerable predictive power, outperform other commonly used variables, and are thus a valuable addition to the conflict forecasting toolkit.
{"title":"I Still Haven’t Found what I’m Looking for: Predicting Security-Related Incidents and Conflict Fatalities with Google Trends and Wikipedia Data","authors":"Christian Oswald","doi":"10.1177/00220027251362832","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251362832","url":null,"abstract":"Conflict forecasting has seen two recent developments: a shift to predicting continuous variables and a debate about the value of <jats:italic>structural</jats:italic> and <jats:italic>procedural</jats:italic> variables. This paper contributes to these efforts and proposes the category of <jats:italic>salience</jats:italic> variables in the form of Google Trends and Wikipedia data. Internet searches can be precursors of conflict intensity as a result of for example an increase in protests, violent behavior, or public announcements. Data are readily and openly available, updated in real time, and provide global coverage which makes it ideal for near-real time forecasting. Prediction targets are the number of security-related incidents and battle-related, non-state, and civilian casualties. I demonstrate the value of <jats:italic>salience</jats:italic> variables using various out-of-sample windows and performance metrics on the country- and province-month level. I find evidence that <jats:italic>salience</jats:italic> variables have considerable predictive power, outperform other commonly used variables, and are thus a valuable addition to the conflict forecasting toolkit.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"285 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144748212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-28DOI: 10.1177/00220027251361656
Syeda ShahBano Ijaz
Does U.S. military assistance affect domestic patterns of political violence? Military aid can improve the recipient country’s military capacity, but also create an incentive for prolonging conflict to secure future assistance. This moral hazard can manifest by geographically displacing conflict away from military strongholds while demonstrating an aggregate country-wide decrease in levels of violence. I analyze U.S. military assistance to Pakistan and find that aid can decrease the aggregate level of political violence in the short run. However, this short-run decrease is accompanied by a displacement of violence away from military headquarters. The discontinuity created by the sudden withdrawal of U.S. military assistance after Pakistan’s nuclear program, followed by its resumption post-9/11, lends causal purchase to my results, as does the historical location of military headquarters that were established by colonizers and have persisted in post-independence Pakistan.
{"title":"Moral Hazard or State Capacity? U.S. Military Assistance and Political Violence in Pakistan","authors":"Syeda ShahBano Ijaz","doi":"10.1177/00220027251361656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251361656","url":null,"abstract":"Does U.S. military assistance affect domestic patterns of political violence? Military aid can improve the recipient country’s military capacity, but also create an incentive for prolonging conflict to secure future assistance. This moral hazard can manifest by geographically displacing conflict away from military strongholds while demonstrating an aggregate country-wide decrease in levels of violence. I analyze U.S. military assistance to Pakistan and find that aid can decrease the aggregate level of political violence in the short run. However, this short-run decrease is accompanied by a displacement of violence away from military headquarters. The discontinuity created by the sudden withdrawal of U.S. military assistance after Pakistan’s nuclear program, followed by its resumption post-9/11, lends causal purchase to my results, as does the historical location of military headquarters that were established by colonizers and have persisted in post-independence Pakistan.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"214 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144715294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-07-15DOI: 10.1177/00220027251359626
Todd Sandler, Justin George
The main purpose of this retrospective of the economic theory of alliances is to characterize three basic paradigms: purely public deterrence, spatial connectivity, and joint products. For each model, allies’ military expenditure (ME) responds differently to the aggregate ME of the other allies, known as defense spillins, thereby resulting in diverse burden sharing, allocative implications, membership composition, and institutional recommendations. The underlying theoretical models determine reduced-form equations for allies’ interdependent defense demands. We examine how changes in strategic doctrines, weapons technology, enemy threats, and membership composition affected NATO burden sharing and its allocative efficiency over time. Generally, changes that increase the share of excludable defense benefits possess a better prognosis for burden sharing and allocative efficiency. Principles and insights from the economic theory of alliances are related to defense demands at the operational level and for non-NATO alliances.
{"title":"Economic Theory of Alliances: Sixty Years Later","authors":"Todd Sandler, Justin George","doi":"10.1177/00220027251359626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251359626","url":null,"abstract":"The main purpose of this retrospective of the economic theory of alliances is to characterize three basic paradigms: purely public deterrence, spatial connectivity, and joint products. For each model, allies’ military expenditure (ME) responds differently to the aggregate ME of the other allies, known as defense spillins, thereby resulting in diverse burden sharing, allocative implications, membership composition, and institutional recommendations. The underlying theoretical models determine reduced-form equations for allies’ interdependent defense demands. We examine how changes in strategic doctrines, weapons technology, enemy threats, and membership composition affected NATO burden sharing and its allocative efficiency over time. Generally, changes that increase the share of excludable defense benefits possess a better prognosis for burden sharing and allocative efficiency. Principles and insights from the economic theory of alliances are related to defense demands at the operational level and for non-NATO alliances.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144629814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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