Global Policy最新文献

Macdonald, K., Bahruddin, Hartoto, A.S., Unger, C., Cisneros, P., Pugley, D.D. et al. (2024). The politics of accountability in global sustainable commodity governance: Dilemmas of institutional competition and convergence. Global Policy, 15, 838–854. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.13426

The name of one of the authors of the article is listed incorrectly. The correct spelling is ‘Dámaris Herrera Salazar’.

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In recent IR literature, the term “regime complexity” has described the phenomenon that international regimes are increasingly overlapping, involving more institutions and actors. Pandemic prevention using a One Health approach represents one example of regime complexity as health threats for humans, animals, and ecosystems become more intertwined, causing a need for widely integrated governance systems. The self-called “Quadripartite of One Health,” consisting of the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH, former OIE) represents a unique collaboration in a situation of regime complexity and global health threats. These cooperative structures that evolved along the COVID-19 pandemic were scrutinized by analyzing semi-structured interviews with 10 employees of the organizations and 15 official documents of the four institutions using a tailor-made analysis framework derived from three selected dimensions of regime complexity: competition, legal inconsistencies, and fragmented accountability. Regime complexity is likely causing negative as well as positive effects on the Quadripartite collaboration, confirming some of the selected arguments of regime complexity literature. It was found that despite their efforts to make use of the positive effects that regime complexity brings about, like data-sharing, exchange of expertise, and increased innovation, several negative effects like discrepancies in terms of rules, procedures, human and financial resources, and understandings of mandates, as well as competition and protectionism, were observed.

As the global landscape of Artificial Intelligence (AI) governance rapidly evolves, research has increasingly moved beyond state-centric perspectives to investigate the role of non-state actors. This paper focuses on an underexplored category of such actors: think tanks, specifically two prominent Chinese institutions—the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology (CAICT) and the Centre for International Security and Strategy (CISS). Drawing on the Communities of Practice (CoPs) approach, this study investigates how these think tanks shape the emerging governance framework for AI technologies by leveraging their position at the boundaries between various CoPs. Specifically, this position of in-betweenness enables them to influence AI governance through acting as boundary brokers. They bridge different Chinese CoPs—including the government, the private sector, and academia—and, in some cases, international CoPs, facilitating engagement and exchange across these communities. This paper also finds that due to differences in their organisational types and relationships with the Chinese government, CAICT and CISS influence AI governance in subtly distinct ways. This paper contributes to CoP scholarship by examining its applicability in an authoritarian context and is among the first to provide a timely empirical analysis of the role of Chinese think tanks in AI governance.

The United States (US) military is increasingly collaborating with startups that position themselves as key providers of security technologies, especially technologies under the umbrella term artificial intelligence (AI). As startups specializing in defense AI development increase their influence, portray themselves as authoritative actors, and follow a distinct financial logic from larger defense companies, International Relations (IR) literature needs to investigate these relatively new actors. Inspired by Science and Technology Studies scholarship in IR, this article focuses on the discourses performed by tech startups publicly, arguing that the distinct financial logic underpinning startups, especially those funded by venture capital, incentivizes these actors to engage in discourses which in turn (re)produce and normalize certain visions of algorithmic warfare. Based on an analysis of open-access sources contextualized by expert interviews, the article first discusses the significance of tech startups in defense AI development. Second, it maps out six key US-based actors in this field. Third, it analyzes the main themes featuring in these startups' discourses, namely portraying AI technologies as solutions to the complexities of warfare, championing AI development as a deterrent against the US' competitors, and advocating for changes in US defense acquisition. It concludes with the policy implications of such discourses.

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were formulated in 2015 by the United Nations to improve human health and achieve sustainable existence at a global level. Failure to reach the SDGs will cause not only increased morbidity and mortality worldwide but also a depletion of natural resources, loss of biodiversity, and irreversible climate warming. Apart from structural and financial barriers, human behavioral reluctance to implement the SDGs is a major challenge. We narratively reviewed and analyzed such behavioral barriers from an evolutionary perspective. One potential explanation of the reluctance to implement the SDGs might be evolved behavioral predispositions that are not consistent with modern, indirectly perceivable threats such as pandemics and climate change. Furthermore, human cooperative behavior did not evolve for long-term cooperation on a global scale. To improve the implementation of the SDGs, it is necessary to develop strategies that are consistent with evolved human behavioral traits.

This article examines the emergence of a hybrid institutional complex (HIC) in global plastics governance. By interrogating the structure, features, and contradictions of hybrid global plastics governance, we foreground the de facto orchestrator role of the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) that promotes multistakeholder partnerships to redress plastic pollution and to realise SDG 12 on Responsible Consumption and Production. However, we contend that embedding voluntary, industry-led multistakeholder initiatives within and through the contested UN Global Plastics Treaty process risks entrenching corporate-friendly governance arrangements at the expense of more stringent governance and systemic transformation. We show how this governance model legitimises weak regulations, promotes voluntary governance that reinforces market norms, and sustains corporate dominance. We thus highlight tensions between procedural mechanisms and substantive sustainability objectives within global plastics governance. Ultimately, we contend that emerging hybrid plastic governance may reinforce, rather than transform, the unsustainable status quo.

During the Covid-19 pandemic, tech startups emerged as important providers of pandemic intelligence, leveraging diverse data sources and advanced computational methods to advise public policy on disease spread and response strategies. This article presents a case study of two tech startups, Airfinity and BlueDot, situating their rise within the increasing private-sector influence in a domain traditionally dominated by the World Health Organization (WHO) and its national public health agencies. It examines how these firms established epistemic authority through the integration of proprietary data, artificial intelligence and novel expertise, enhancing their scientific credibility and gaining access to key global and national policy arenas and public-sector contracts. The article discusses how the emergence of a commercial market for pandemic intelligence dilutes the WHO's authority within global disease surveillance and raises concerns about outsourcing essential public health insights to the private sector. Further, it explores how the business of pandemic intelligence transforms public health data into commercial products, challenging norms that posit equity and public purpose as basis for the digital transformation of the public health sphere. This analysis contributes to ongoing debates about the technology sector's expanding influence over public health and policy, highlighting the growing role of private power in global governance.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has faced scrutiny over the alignment between its public rhetoric and actual policy advice vis-à-vis progressive taxation. This article analyzes the IMF's tax recommendations to 125 countries between 2022 and 2024, drawing on a novel dataset of 1049 tax reform proposals extracted from Article IV surveillance reports. While the IMF has publicly endorsed progressive taxation to reduce inequality and support fiscal sustainability, our findings reveal a disconnect between these statements and on-the-ground advice. High-income countries were more likely to receive progressive tax guidance, whereas low- and middle-income countries were disproportionately advised to implement regressive measures, such as increases in value-added taxes and environmental taxes. Progressive tools like wealth and capital gains taxes were rarely recommended, and when they were, advice was concentrated in high-income contexts. This pattern suggests that IMF tax policy advice continues to reflect orthodox priorities, emphasizing revenue mobilization over equity, and thereby undermining the Fund's professed commitment to inclusive economic policies.